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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY POLICY:
POLITICAL ECONOMY, INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY, AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL EFFECTS
Environmental regulatory policy in the U.S. is a mixture of federal, state, and
local activity and impacts. This is true of air quality regulations, which are governed at
the federal level by the Clean Air Act. This dissertation analyzes both the political
economy of federal environmental regulations and the empirical effects of ozone
regulations under the Clean Air Act.
A political economy model is developed that offers a motivation for political
support of national environmental policy that regulates strictly local pollution. Altering
local environmental policies in other jurisdictions will cause capital migration, which
may increase local welfare. Thus, individuals have an incentive to influence local policies
in other jurisdictions. National environmental policy then becomes a potential tool for
inter-jurisdictional competition.
The empirical impacts of ground-level ozone regulations under the Clean Air Act
are also analyzed. The Clean Air Act established minimum air quality standards;
localities failing to meet the established standards are classified as nonattainment areas
and are subject to additional environmental regulations. These new regulations have a
direct impact on polluting industries, and therefore also an indirect impact on the
revenues and expenditures of local governments.
First, nonattainment status is seen to alter regional industrial geography. Overall
economic activity declines in both nonattainment areas and the surrounding jurisdictions.
Gaining attainment status partially mitigates these impacts, although to some extent the

economic impacts in both nonattainment areas and the surrounding jurisdictions do
permanently persist. I also find evidence that manufacturing activity relocates from
nonattainment areas to surrounding areas that face more lenient air quality regulations.
Ozone nonattainment status is also seen to produce fiscal effects for local
governments as changes in industrial geography alter local tax bases. Revenues and
expenditures decline in regulated population centers, while they increase in surrounding
areas. These increases diminish with distance from the urban center. Also, the fiscal
impacts persist even after attainment status has been gained.
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Intergovernmental Fiscal Impacts, Clean Air Act
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Environmental regulatory policy in the U.S. is a mixture of federal, state, and
local activity and impacts. This is true of air quality policies, which are governed at the
federal level by the Clean Air Act. The analysis in this dissertation develops a political
economy model explaining one motivation for the existence of federal environmental
policies that have local policy targets. It also empirically tests the regulatory impacts of
the Clean Air Act on regional industrial geography and on local government finance.

Theoretical Focus
While local jurisdictions are free to implement local environmental regulations,
federal regulations are often developed that focus on local polluting activity. A common
explanation for this is that local jurisdictions lack the legal or political capability to
regulate pollution that crosses local jurisdictional boundaries. However, this does not
explain ground-level ozone regulation under the Clean Air Act.
The Clean Air Act and its amendments establish national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) for several criteria pollutants, including ground-level ozone.
Counties failing to meet the NAAQS for a specific pollutant are classified as being in
nonattainment for that pollutant. While nonattainment areas may include multiple
counties, they are contained within state boundaries. Ground-level ozone pollution is
primarily local in nature; local pollution sources are largely responsible for local ozone
levels. Also, the Clean Air Act is not designed to primarily focus on the interjurisdictional pollution that contributes to local air quality, but instead focuses on local
pollution sources that contribute to local air quality degradations. States could implement
their own air quality regulations or create regional authorities for this purpose in areas
with poor air quality; states, or regional authorities that could be created by counties or
states, contain both the polluted air and the responsible pollution sources, and so could
regulate local or regional polluting activity. However, we instead see the implementation
of federal air quality regulations.
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In this dissertation I develop a model offering an explanation for why federal
environmental policies arise when the regulated pollution is local in nature. In the model,
environmental policy increases the cost of production in regulated jurisdictions and
reduces the national rate of return to capital. This causes capital to migrate, which in turn
alters local wage rates throughout the national economy. The changes in local wage rates
and national returns to capital will harm some localities, while it may benefit others. Thus,
a situation arises when individuals may prefer environmental policies in other
jurisdictions that differ from the policy preference of residents of those jurisdictions.
National environmental policy is thus a potential tool for inter-jurisdictional competition.

The Clean Air Act
Before discussing the empirical analysis in this dissertation, it is important to
understand how the Clean Air Act regulates local air quality. Prior to the 1970 Clean Air
Act, air quality regulation was largely the responsibility of states. By creating the Clean
Air Act, Congress greatly increased the stringency of air quality regulation. National
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) were established for several criteria pollutants.
The nation was divided into air quality regions, and regions failing to meet the NAAQS
were classified as being in nonattainment. States were required to submit a state
implementation plan (SIP) designed to bring nonattainment regions into attainment.
In 1977, Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments. These amendments
were in response to frustrations with the implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act.
States were considered to be making insufficient progress in implementing effective
regulations and improving regional air quality. A variety of causes can be cited for this
lack of progress, including a lack of technical expertise or resources on the part of states,
confusion concerning how states were expected to implement the Clean Air Act
regulations, and litigation on the part of both industrial and environmental groups.
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments replaced the air quality regions with
county-level attainment classifications. Beginning in 1978, all counties or parts of
counties were classified as either being in or out of attainment for each criteria pollutant.
Federal penalties were also increased. Federal funding for states was tied to state
compliance with the Clean Air Act, and new federal civil penalties were created for
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polluters that ignored Clean Air Act requirements. The Clean Air Act was amended again
in 1990, making changes to a number of specific regulatory requirements such as
abatement technology requirements and permissible automobile emissions. The 1990
amendments did not make the same types of structural changes to implementation that
the 1977 amendments made.
Attainment status for each county is determined by air quality measurements. If
an area fails to meet the NAAQS for a particular pollutant for three consecutive years, it
is subject to being declared in nonattainment. Nonattainment status is not automatic, but
is an administrative decision within the EPA. Once an area is declared to be in
nonattainment, the state containing the nonattainment area is required to submit a state
implementation plan (SIP) to the EPA. The SIP details what actions will be taken to bring
the area into compliance with the NAAQS.
While states are given some flexibility when developing SIPs, there are specific
requirements each SIP must meet in order to be approved by the EPA. New facilities in
nonattainment areas are required to use abatement technology leading to the lowest
achievable emission rate; this requirement is not supposed to take cost into consideration.
Existing facilities in nonattainment areas are required to use reasonably available control
technology, which typically involves retrofitting.
Facilities in attainment areas are also subject to regulations; these regulations are
aimed at the prevention of significant deterioration in air quality. Large new facilities are
required to use the best available control technology. The specific technology
requirements are negotiated on a case by case basis, and cost is taken into consideration.
Thus, while new facilities in attainment areas may still be subject to emissions
regulations, nonattainment status brings stricter regulations for polluting firms.
Once a nonattainment area has met the NAAQS, it can be reclassified as an
attainment area. When this occurs, nonattainment regulations are no longer enforced.
Instead, states are required to submit a maintenance plan for these areas describing what
actions will be taken to maintain air quality compliance. The requirements for SIPs do
not apply to maintenance plans; rather, states are given more flexibility in determining
what regulations will be enforced to maintain attainment status.
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Between 1978 and 2003, the years covered in this analysis, the Clean Air Act
regulated 7 criteria pollutants: 1-hour ozone, carbon monoxide, lead, particulate matter
smaller than 10 microns, nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and total suspended particulates.
Not all of these pollutants were regulated for the entirety of this 26-year period, although
the 1-hour ozone standard was enforced during this whole period. The 1-hour ozone
standard is so named because it limits the 1-hour average concentration of ground-level
ozone. The 1-hour standard was revoked after 2004 for almost all areas; ground-level
ozone is now regulated by an 8-hour standard.
While ozone is beneficial in the upper atmosphere, ground-level ozone is the main
ingredient of smog and is harmful to both human health and vegetation. Ozone can cause
respiratory health problems, and children and those with asthma are the most sensitive to
ozone exposure. Ozone is not released directly into the atmosphere, but instead it is
created by a chemical reaction between nitrous oxides (NOx) and volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) that is caused by sunlight. Roughly half of NOx and VOC emissions
are from automobiles; the rest come from various industrial sources such as electric
power generation facilities.

Empirical Focus
The empirical chapters in this dissertation focus on the impacts of ground-level
ozone nonattainment status. There is an existing literature concerning the impacts of
ozone nonattainment on polluting industries; this literature provides the setting for the
present research. Nonattainment regulations are designed to improve local air quality by
targeting polluting facilities. This has been shown to significantly decrease not only
pollution, but also economic activity in polluting industries in areas in nonattainment for
the 1-hour ozone standard.
While much of the existing literature focuses on industry-level impacts of ozone
nonattainment regulations, I take a more geographically oriented approach. As polluting
activity declines in nonattainment areas, other industries may move into the area
replacing the lost polluting economic activity. Alternatively, inter-industry ties may cause
overall local declines in economic activity as industries with ties to polluting firms are
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also affected. To capture these overall impacts, I analyze the relationship between ozone
nonattainment regulations and aggregate local economic indicators.
Local economies do not exist in isolation. Instead, economic changes in one
jurisdiction are expected to spill over into neighboring areas. Thus, focusing strictly on
nonattainment areas fails to give a complete picture of the regional regulatory impacts. It
is important to note that nonattainment regulations are only applied in nonattainment
areas. The broader regional impacts of these regulations are caused by regional economic
linkages, not regional application of air quality regulations. Polluting activity may
relocate into surrounding areas where capital investments are less costly because these
areas are not subject to nonattainment regulations. If this occurs, regulatory impact
estimates based only on nonattainment areas will overestimate industrial impacts. It may
also be the case that reductions in economic activity in nonattainment areas cause similar
reductions in surrounding areas because of regional economic linkages. If this is the case,
then analysis limited to nonattainment areas will underestimate the regional and national
economic impacts of nonattainment regulations.
Not only are the impacts in nonattainment areas important, but so is the
persistence of these impacts. Nonattainment regulations are intended to improve local air
quality; once air quality standards have been met, these regulations are replaced by a
maintenance plan that is focused on maintaining, rather than improving, local air quality.
While nonattainment regulations are no longer implemented in areas that have gained
attainment, it is not expected that the economic impacts of nonattainment status are
immediately reversed. Some persistence is expected because of the nature of the
nonattainment regulations; firms made investment decisions during the nonattainment
period based on the stricter nonattainment regulations, and these decisions will have
impacts for firms beyond the point when attainment status is gained. Also, regulations
implemented to maintain attainment status are expected to have local and regional
economic impacts. There is not, however, an a priori expectation of the extent to which
economic impacts will persist after attainment status has been gained. These impacts may
be transient, largely disappearing several years after attainment status has been gained, or
the impacts could be permanent. Analyzing the nature of regulatory impact persistence is
important for understanding the temporal effects of ozone nonattainment regulations.
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Finally, the industrial impacts of nonattainment regulations are expected to affect
local governments. Cities and counties are not responsible for implementing
nonattainment regulations, but they are not isolated from regulatory impacts; industrial
regulatory impacts will affect the tax bases of local governments. Thus, local
governments are not expected to experience regulatory impacts because of direct
compliance costs, which are paid by firms that invest in new abatement technology.
Instead, nonattainment regulations are expected to indirectly affect the revenues and
expenditures of local governments as industrial impacts alter local tax bases.

Copyright © Douglas A. Carr 2007
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Chapter 2
A Political Economy Approach to Environmental Regulations in a
Federated System

Central governments create a variety of national policies, including policies
designed to correct problems that are contained within single jurisdictions. When the
policy targets are strictly local in nature, local jurisdictions may have the ability to
address the situations with local policies. Yet central governments often still create
national policies that regulate strictly local activity.
For example, the Clean Air Act created national ambient air quality standards that
apply to specific pollutants. These standards are applied at the local level, and localities
failing to meet the standards over a three year period are declared to be non-attainment
areas. The standards primarily focus on local air quality, not on trans-boundary pollution.
Once an area is declared a non-attainment area, the state is required to submit a state
implementation plan outlining what actions will be taken to achieve the ambient air
quality standards. State implementation plans create additional regulations for industries
that are located within non-attainment areas.
Another example is found in a 1996 European Union Council Directive. This
Directive creates local air quality standards regulating several air pollutants. Similar to
the Clean Air Act, the Directive includes regulations pertaining to local air pollution.
Such regulatory decisions could have been left to individual member states.
In these examples, a central government has created a regulation that focuses on
local environmental quality and not trans-boundary pollution externalities. Each
jurisdiction where the central regulation is binding could have enacted a similar local
regulation but chose not to do so. Why do central governments create such policies? The
following model offers an explanation. Environmental policy causes capital to migrate in
the model; national environmental policy then becomes a tool for inter-jurisdictional
competition through which local capital stocks are altered, potentially producing local
welfare benefits. Thus, jurisdictions have an incentive to influence national
environmental policy.
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Much of the environmental regulation literature considers competition for capital.
For example, see Levinson (2003), Oates and Schwab (1988), Eerola (2004), and
Fredriksson and Gaston (2000). A key question addressed both by this model and by the
existing literature is whether outcomes are efficient when there is competition involving
mobile capital.
Oates and Schwab (1988) develop a model including competition for capital with
an environmental tax, and find that the decentralized median voter outcome is efficient
because local workers receive the full benefit of pollution abatement and bear the full
burden of capital relocation1. They also find that heterogeneous populations within a
jurisdiction may lead to inefficient local policies because the majority in a locality may
externalize policy outcomes onto a minority of local residents. The model in the present
chapter finds that the decentralized environmental policy choices of homogeneous
jurisdictions are not first-best optimal because each jurisdiction ignores the effects of
capital migration on all other jurisdictions.
Markusen and Morey (1995) develop an interjurisdictional capital competition
model that leads to decentralized outcomes that are inefficient. Levinson (1997)
highlights that the source of the inefficiency does not directly arise from competition, but
as the incidence of a local tax on production is exported to consumers in other
jurisdictions. A key difference between this outcome and that of the model in the present
chapter is that in the latter competition for local income and environmental quality, which
are functions of local capital, directly creates an incentive to influence policies in other
jurisdictions without considering the full welfare impacts of such policies.

The Model
This analysis models a closed economy where capital is freely mobile and labor is
immobile. Pollution, which is produced in the production process, is strictly local in
nature, not trans-boundary.

1

The model in this paper shares several key assumptions with the Oates and Schwab model. Both models
assume capital is mobile, labor is immobile, pollution is not trans-boundary, and people work and live in
the same jurisdiction.
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Firms
All firms produce a single homogeneous product that is used as numéraire. Firms
experience constant returns to scale, and there are many perfectly competitive firms of
indeterminate size in each jurisdiction. Production in jurisdiction is a function of the
fixed local labor supply and local capital ;

. Production is concave with

respect to labor and capital. Using subscripts to indicate partial derivatives, the marginal
and the marginal productivity of labor is

productivity of capital is given by

Capital and labor exhibit diminishing marginal returns;
capital are complements, so

and

.

. Labor and

.

Firms emit pollution as part of the production process. This pollution is strictly
local in nature, only affecting the local environment in the local jurisdiction. The local
jurisdiction sets a required environmental reclamation expenditure for firms. This
expenditure equals a portion of total output and is given by

, where

;

corresponds with no local environmental reclamation expenditures.
Perfectly competitive local labor and national capital markets are assumed. Both
, the equilibrium rate of return to capital, and

, the equilibrium wage rate in

jurisdiction , are treated as exogenous by firms. Profits for firms in jurisdiction are then
given by
(1)
Maximizing

with respect to ,

(2)
Similarly, maximizing

with respect to ,

(3)
Thus, individual firms will employ the quantity of capital and labor that results in the rate
of return to each factor equaling a portion of its marginal productivity as determined by
.
Because firms experience constant returns to scale, by Euler’s theorem
. For firms, this means that
9

(4)
Applying this to the profit function in (1),

(5)
Thus,

; firms do not earn pure profits in equilibrium.

Local Markets
The local labor supply in jurisdiction is fixed at . Also, the total demand for
capital in jurisdiction is . Firms within a jurisdiction use the same production
technology, so each firm faces the same production function. Total local production in
jurisdiction aggregated across all local firms is then

. Note that the production

function is allowed to vary across jurisdictions. Because both
given

and the local policy

, the local capital stock

and

,

and the local wage rate

are

determined by recursively solving the following set of equations taken from the firm
profit maximization in (2) and (3). Specifically, the first equation is solved for
of

and

, and then this result is used in the second equation to solve for

in terms

in terms of

the same variables.
(6)
Thus the local capital stock is
by

and the equilibrium local wage rate is given

.
Consider the relationship between the local demand for capital and the local

policy

. Recall the firm’s profit maximization in (2). Since firms take

as exogenous,
(7)

by the implicit function theorem. Also,
(8)
Turning to wage impacts, note that by Euler’s theorem,
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, or

(9)
Thus,
(10)
Substituting from (7) yields
(11)
Similarly, ignoring the relationship between

and

,
(12)

and substituting from (8) yields
(13)

National Economy
There are separate jurisdictions in the national economy. A nationally fixed
capital stock is freely mobile between jurisdictions. The combined local demands for
capital determine the national demand. Given a fixed national capital supply , the
national demand for capital,

, determines the national equilibrium rate of return to

capital, . Capital is mobile and will migrate until the local rate of return to capital
. The following system of

equals the national equilibrium rate of return;
equations simultaneously determines

and

.
(14)

Thus,
(15)
While

is a local policy parameter, it affects the national capital market. Using

the system of equations in (14), the value of

in equilibrium is derived; the proof

is found in Proof 2.1.
(16)

11

Increasing the stringency of a local reclamation policy in one jurisdiction will
increase the quantity of capital demanded in all other jurisdictions as it reduces the
national equilibrium rate of return to capital. Formally,
(17)
Noting that a fixed national capital stock implies that an increase in the quantity of capital
demanded in all jurisdictions must be offset by a decrease in demand for capital in the
regulated jurisdiction, or formally
(18)
the following describes environmental policy impacts on local capital stocks.

(19)

This observation implies that a local reclamation policy reduces local production while
increasing production in all other jurisdictions.
(20)
Personal income is derived from wages and from capital income. A single
representative household supplies labor and is endowed with
income is

and capital income is

capital. Thus, wage

. The one private good produced by firms, ,

is used as numéraire. Thus, the total income of the representative household in
jurisdiction is given by
(21)
Note that

uniquely determines , as seen in (22).

(22)
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Local Environmental Policy
Pollutants are produced in the production process and are measured by
local policy

. The

determines the end-of-pipe abatement expenditures per unit of output;

these expenditures reduce pollution by a factor of

, where

. Thus, total

pollution is given by
(23)
The impact of the local policy

on pollution is
(24)

The policy

reduces local pollution. Local environmental quality is a function of local

pollution;

where

. Thus,
(25)

The local policy

results in improved local environmental quality. Reclamation policy

adjustments in other jurisdictions will result in local environmental quality changes as
capital migrates.
(26)
Each jurisdiction sets its local environmental policy;
a binding environmental policy

. Note that

. In the absence of
uniquely determine .
(27)

The environmental policy modeled here does not directly regulate pollution
emissions. Instead, the policy is tied to imposing a cost on total output and achieves
improved environmental quality by increasing the cost of production and increasing
pollution abatement expenditures. Note that from the firm’s perspective, a stricter
environmental quality standard only increases the cost of production via

and does not

prohibit any given level of production or associated pollution.

Decentralized Policy Outcome
Individuals value personal consumption and local environmental quality; the
utility of residents in jurisdiction is given by

. People are assumed to live and

work in the same jurisdiction. Also, individual preferences are assumed to be convex,
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implying that first order conditions are sufficient for maximizing utility or a corner
solution exists.
When setting the local environmental policy

, jurisdictions take

and

as given and maximize local welfare. Thus,
(28)
and
(29)
Since jurisdictions are small and therefore take

as given, from an individual

jurisdiction’s perspective
(30)
this is seen by differentiating (9). The marginal impact on environmental quality is seen
from (24) when

is taken as given;
(31)

Jurisdictions will balance the tradeoff between the reduction in wage earnings and
the improvements in environmental quality that result from the local environmental
policy

. The optimal value of

is characterized as follows.

(32)
The marginal cost of an increase in

, incurred as income decreases, equals the marginal

benefit of the environmental quality improvement resulting from an increase in

.

Substituting from (30) and (31), (32) becomes
(33)
To understand the efficiency of this decentralized equilibrium, compare it with the
first-best choice of

,

, and

by a central planner for all jurisdictions. The first-best

resource distribution and policy choices are characterized in (34); the proof is found in
Proof 2.2.
(34)
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Since
(35)
the characterization in (34) is different from the decentralized equilibrium
characterization in (32).
Proposition 1. The decentralized equilibrium is not first-best efficient.
is not maximized

(36)

National Policy Preferences
I now turn to preferences regarding a national environmental policy that tightens
the most lenient policies resulting from the decentralized equilibrium. First the case of
symmetric jurisdictions is considered, and then the general case is analyzed.

Symmetric Jurisdictions
Consider the case of symmetric jurisdictions. When jurisdictions are symmetric,
,
and

,
,

,

, and

. Given ,

. Thus,

and

. Because
. In the decentralized

equilibrium, there is no capital migration.
Now consider a national policy, , requiring that
decentralized equilibrium value of

. Set at the lowest

and consider a marginal increase in . Because

, tightening this national policy will alter the local reclamation policy in all
jurisdictions. From (19), the change in demand for capital in each jurisdiction is
(37)
Differentiating (9), the marginal impact of the national policy on wage income is
seen.

(38)
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While a marginal change in does not cause capital migration, returns to capital are
affected as demand for capital decreases in all jurisdictions. This is seen formally from
and

(16). Because

,

(39)
Combining this with the previous observation of wage impacts, the affect on local income
is seen by differentiating (21).
(40)
Because

,
(41)

Turning to environmental quality, an increase in improves the local
environmental quality in each jurisdiction. The following is seen from (24) and (25).

(42)
The local welfare impact of can now be understood. Starting from the decentralized
equilibrium characterized in (33), consider the welfare impact of a marginal increase in .
The marginal cost of an increase in is given in (41), and the marginal benefit is given in
(42). Comparing (41) with (30), it is seen that

. Thus, the marginal cost

to one jurisdiction of an increase in equals the marginal cost of an increase in

from

its decentralized equilibrium value.
While there is no difference in the marginal cost of a change in
difference in the marginal benefit. It is seen that

and , there is a

from (42) and (31).

This is because there are no capital stock adjustments when considering a national policy
standard for symmetric jurisdictions. The marginal benefit of an increase in is then less
than the marginal benefit of an increase in

from its decentralized equilibrium value.
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(43)
Thus, from the decentralized equilibrium policy choice characterized in (32), an increase
in

reduces local welfare because the marginal benefit of improved environmental

quality resulting from the policy increase is less than its marginal cost.
(44)
Proposition 2. In the case of symmetric jurisdictions, no jurisdiction has an
incentive to increase the national minimum environmental policy. Instead, welfare
in all jurisdictions would increase if the local environmental policy was
simultaneously decreased in all jurisdictions.
(45)
In the decentralized equilibrium, each jurisdiction attempts to use local
environmental policy to improve the local environmental quality in part by driving away
capital. This creates a negative externality on the other jurisdictions, which receive the
additional capital and resulting pollution. Because of this externality caused by capital
migration, local regulations are too stringent in the decentralized equilibrium for
symmetric jurisdictions. Even though there is no capital migration in equilibrium, the
potential for such migration was considered by each jurisdiction when setting local
environmental policy. A coordinated reduction of all local environmental policies would
counter this externality, improving welfare in all jurisdictions.
This provides a normative basis for evaluating environmental policy when
jurisdictions are symmetric. In the absence of capital migration in the symmetric case,
decentralized environmental policies targeting strictly local pollution are too stringent in
all jurisdictions. This inefficiency results from the environmental externality that occurs
when jurisdictions attempt to chase polluting capital away and into other jurisdictions; the
cost of local environmental improvement is partially externalized onto other jurisdictions.

Asymmetric Jurisdictions
Now consider an economy where jurisdictions are not symmetric. Also, let now
indicate the type of jurisdiction, where there are
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symmetric individual jurisdictions of

each type

. This means, for example, that

will now indicate the income in

any one jurisdiction that is of type . Order these types so that
Consider a national policy,

.

, that will increase the national minimum

reclamation policy from the decentralized equilibrium. A marginal increase in

; the

only have a direct regulatory impact in type 1 jurisdictions because
new national minimum value for

will

will only be binding in type 1 jurisdictions. Given the

decentralized equilibrium stringency of local environmental policy in each jurisdiction,
increasing

may increase or decrease welfare in each jurisdiction.
will alter the local environmental policy in all jurisdictions

Because a change in
of type 1, from (19)

(46)
Because

,

for each symmetric jurisdiction of type 1. Also,

can be broken into two components: the change in demand for capital directly
caused by the change in local environmental policy, and the change in local demand for
capital caused by the change in

resulting from altering the local environmental policy

in all type 1 jurisdictions. Thus,
(47)
The national policy

will affect the local environmental policy in many

jurisdictions, all of which are of type 1. Because of this, jurisdictions will consider the
impact on

of an increase in

. Thus, the wage impact for a change in

is seen from

the following derivation of (9).

(48)

The impact on local income is then described by the following.
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(49)

when

Note that

if

; income will increase in capital importing

jurisdictions that are not of type 1.
The relationship between capital migration and
in Figure 2.1. A change in

where

is illustrated

does not affect the local environmental policy in

jurisdictions other than those of type 1, so the only impact on these jurisdictions comes
through the impact of

on

. The decrease in

caused by an increase in

will result

in a loss of capital income shown by the blue box and a gain in wage income shown by
the hashed trapezoid. In Figure 2.1a, the jurisdiction is a capital importer, resulting in a
net increase in local income. The jurisdiction in Figure 2.1b is a capital exporter; this
jurisdiction experiences a net decrease in income from a decrease in .
The impact of an increase in

on environmental quality is derived from (23) and

(25).

(50)

Even though individual jurisdictions of type 1 have maximized local welfare
through their choice of local environmental policy, one may wonder if they would
support a national policy that increases the stringency of environmental policy in all
jurisdictions of type 1. Such a coordinated increase across all jurisdictions of type 1 may
have different welfare effects than an increase in only the local jurisdiction. At the
decentralized equilibrium value of
to jurisdiction 1 of an increase in
if

;

, from (30) and (49) it is seen that the marginal cost
is greater than the marginal cost of an increase in
when jurisdictions of type 1 are capital exporters in the

decentralized equilibrium. Also, using (47) to compare (31) and (50),
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Figure 2.1: Capital Migration and Income Effects of a Change in
(a) Capital importing jurisdiction

(b) Capital exporting jurisdiction
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(51)
The marginal benefit of improved environmental quality in jurisdiction 1 from an
increase in

is smaller than the marginal benefit of an increase in

. Thus, at the

decentralized equilibrium policy choice characterized in (32), the marginal cost of an
increase in

exceeds its marginal benefit when jurisdictions of type 1 are capital

exporters in the decentralized equilibrium. In this case, an increase in

will reduce

welfare in jurisdiction 1.
(52)
When type 1 jurisdictions are capital exporters, the decentralized choice of

is

too high from the collective perspective of type 1 jurisdictions, and these jurisdictions
would benefit from a coordinated reduction in environmental policy across all type 1
jurisdictions. Such type 1 jurisdictions would not support a national policy that increased
. As was true in the symmetric case, capital exporting type 1 jurisdictions will make
their local environmental policy too stringent because of the externality resulting from
capital migration; local environmental policy in one type 1 jurisdiction will cause capital
to migrate into all other type 1 jurisdictions, thus reducing their environmental quality.
If type 1 jurisdictions are capital importers, then both the marginal cost and
marginal benefit from an increase in
that

are lower than they are in (33) and it may be true

. If this is the case, then the decentralized choice of

is too low. Each

type 1 jurisdiction would then benefit from a coordinated tightening of environmental
policy in all type 1 jurisdictions.
Lemma 1. If type 1 jurisdictions are capital importers, they may prefer a national
policy that strengthens environmental policy in all type 1 jurisdictions. If type 1
jurisdictions are capital exporters, they will always oppose such a policy.
(53)
Now consider the other jurisdiction types in the economy. At the decentralized
equilibrium, jurisdiction

favors an increase in the national standard

if the

marginal benefit of the tightening exceeds its marginal cost. Because an increase in
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will decrease environmental quality in these jurisdictions, a tightening of the national
policy will be supported if the welfare change from the income effect more than offsets
the welfare lost from the environmental degradation. Otherwise, a tightening of the
national policy would not be supported. Formally,

(54)

Substituting from (49),
(55)
is necessary to satisfy (54) when

. Since the left hand side must be positive

to satisfy the inequality, a necessary condition to satisfy (55) is then

; as with

type 1 jurisdictions, capital importing jurisdictions may favor an increase in
importing jurisdictions will favor an increase in the national standard
decentralized equilibrium value of

. Capital

from the

if the marginal benefit from the resulting increased

income exceeds the marginal cost of the environmental degradation caused by the
national policy change. Capital exporting jurisdictions will always favor a reduction in
from (54),

;

for such jurisdictions. Combining these observations when

with Lemma 1, the following is seen.
Proposition 3. Capital importing jurisdictions may prefer a national policy that
strengthens the most lenient local policies, while capital exporting jurisdictions
will always oppose such a policy.
(56)
In the case of asymmetric jurisdictions, a tightening of the most lenient local
environmental policies is not Pareto improving. Instead, welfare will likely increase in
some jurisdictions, while it will decrease in others. Given the prior decentralized
equilibrium value of local environmental policy in each jurisdiction, jurisdictions
benefiting from the national policy will be capital importers, while capital exporting
jurisdictions will be harmed by the national policy. If type 1 jurisdictions would benefit
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from an increase in

, their welfare improvement would come from improved local

environmental quality.
It is interesting to note that for jurisdictions not of type 1, a preference for a
national policy increasing the minimum standard for local environmental regulation does
not arise because of environmental quality improvements; rather, such a preference may
arise because of the capital migration and the resulting rise in local income that the
national policy would induce in these jurisdictions. Jurisdictions not of type 1 would
experience a decline in environmental quality, but this decline would be more than offset
by an increase in local income in jurisdictions that favor the national policy.
In general, when jurisdictions are asymmetric a national policy tightening the
minimum standard for local environmental policy will have differing effects on the
various types of jurisdictions. These differing welfare effects do not arise in the
symmetric case because all jurisdictions experience symmetric policy impacts. When
there are asymmetric policy impacts, individual jurisdictions may form coalitions to
influence national environmental policy decisions. Such coalitions will attempt to
improve welfare in some jurisdictions at the cost of other jurisdictions.

Empirical Expectations
For an empirical application, consider ground-level ozone regulations under the
Clean Air Act. These regulations have been shown to affect firm location decisions in
polluting industries; see Henderson (1996), Becker and Henderson (2000), and List and
McHone (2000). The Clean Air Act influences location decisions because pollution
abatement expenditures required by the Clean Air Act typically cost polluting facilities
hundreds of thousands of dollars annually (Becker 2005). Thus, the Clean Air Act
ground-level ozone regulations function similar to

and provide an empirical context for

this model.
One motivation for ground-level ozone regulations under the Clean Air Act is that
by forcing some jurisdictions to tighten environmental regulations, capital will relocate to
the benefit of certain jurisdictions. Using the Clean Air Act ground-level ozone
regulations as an example, localities that may have an incentive to encourage more
stringent federal environmental policy standards can be identified.

23

From Proposition 3, jurisdictions that benefit from a national environmental
policy standard will be capital importers. Empirically, capital importing jurisdictions are
likely those that, all else equal, are poor or are growing rapidly. Rapid growth is an
indication that a jurisdiction is importing capital. Poor areas are expected to have a low
capital endowment and receive most personal income through wage earnings. Areas with
low capital endowments will likely import capital, even if they use a relatively small
capital stock.
Figure 2.2 uses 1980 census data to divide counties according to per capital
income. The poorer counties identified here are likely capital importers and may benefit
from a national ground-level ozone policy standard.
Polluting firms that will migrate in response to nonattainment regulations are
most likely in the manufacturing sector. Counties that are rapidly growing in response to
the Clean Air Act are thus expected to experience rapid growth in manufacturing sector
activity. Figure 2.3 identifies counties that grew by more than 20% in manufacturing
sector employment between 1987 and 1992. These counties likely benefited from
nonattainment regulations enforced in other jurisdictions.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 identify many counties that may benefit from a national
ground-level ozone policy standard. Such counties would be natural allies in supporting a
national environmental policy standard for ground-level ozone.

Concluding Remarks
In the model presented in this chapter, local environmental policies affect the
national capital market. A local policy in one jurisdiction causes capital to relocate,
altering wage rates and capital income in all jurisdictions. Environmental quality in all
jurisdictions is also affected by this capital migration. There will be an incentive to
influence environmental policies in other jurisdictions in order to improve local welfare;
national environmental policy provides a means through which this can be accomplished.
In general, it is expected that welfare will decline in jurisdictions that are net exporters of
capital in response to tightening the national environmental policy standard, while
welfare may increase in jurisdictions that are net importers of capital.
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Figure 2.2: Per Capita Income, 1979
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Figure 2.3: Manufacturing Sector Employment Growth, 1987-1992

This result offers one explanation for why we observe central governments
enacting environmental regulations with apparently purely local policy targets. The local
environmental policy target has inter-jurisdictional implications; while the policy target is
local, income and environmental effects are experienced in all jurisdictions as capital
migrates in response to environmental policy. National environmental policy then
becomes a tool for inter-jurisdictional competition.
This model could be extended to further the understanding of the efficiency of
environmental policy preferences. The environmental tax competition literature examines
tax harmonization as a potential solution to inefficiencies from decentralized outcomes;
for example, see Cassing and Kuhn (2003) , Cremer and Gahvari (2004), and Duval and
Hamilton (2002). The model in this chapter could be extended to compare the efficiency
of decentralized equilibrium outcomes with that of a harmonized national policy when
jurisdictions are not symmetric.
The relationship between capital migration in this model and vertical externalities
could also be explored. As Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) describe, local policies may
not only horizontally affect other jurisdictions but also other levels of government. This
could be explored by allowing the national government to tax production for the
provision of a public good. The use of national policy for horizontal competition between
local jurisdictions could then have interesting vertical efficiency implications.
Finally, the present analysis restricts the environmental policy instrument to a
uniform requirement for all firms based on production. Varying the policy instrument
may alter its effectiveness as a tool for competition, possibly leading to more efficient
decentralized and national policy outcomes. Future research could focus on the
relationship between policy instrument design and horizontal competition.
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Proof 2.1: Proof of (16)
Let

and

recall that

and

. Also,

. First, take the total derivative of

, , , and

.

(A.1)

Next substitute

and

into

and

.

(A.2)

Each

is chosen taking the value of

in all other jurisdictions as given. Once the

economy is in equilibrium and the value of

has been optimized in each jurisdiction, the

impact in jurisdiction of a marginal change in
subsequent adjustment in

by the envelope theorem. Thus, in equilibrium
when considering the effects of a change

can be treated as independent from
in

, implying that the coefficient of

Factoring

and

can be analyzed ignoring the

must equal zero in the above equations.

and then using the coefficient for

following is seen.
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in each equation, the

(A.3)

Restating (A.3) in matrix notation,

(A.4)

By Cramer’s rule,

is then calculated as follows.

(A.5)

I now calculate the relevant partial derivatives.

(A.6)

Thus,
(A.7)
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Proof 2.2: Proof of (34)
Let
best choice of

give the social welfare function for the economy. The first,

, and

for all jurisdictions will maximize

subject to

.

Solving
(B.1)
using the Lagrangian method produces
(B.2)
and the following first order conditions.

(B.3)

Because

,

and

. Thus, the first order

conditions can be rewritten.

(B.4)

Rearranging and dividing these equations, the following is seen.

(B.5)

Given that
(B.6)
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the characterization of the first-best resource distribution and policy choices can be
derived from (B.5).
(B.7)

Copyright © Douglas A. Carr 2007
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Chapter 3
The Industrial Geography Impacts of the Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act and its amendments are designed to improve local air quality
by targeting polluting sources. In localities with poor air quality, polluting industries are
required to make additional investments in pollution abatement. Industry-level studies
have shown that these requirements affect the output and location of polluting industries.
To understand the overall impacts of the Clean Air Act on local economies, analysis not
limited to polluting industries is necessary; inter-industry linkages will also result in
regulatory impacts in nonpolluting industries.
This chapter focuses on the impacts of the Clean Air Act on regional industrial
geography. By considering impacts aggregated across polluting and nonpolluting
industries, the overall local and regional impacts of the Clean Air Act can be understood.
Recognizing that regional economies are highly interdependent, this analysis considers
the regulatory impact both in regulated counties and the surrounding areas to capture the
regional effects of the Clean Air Act.
The Clean Air Act regulates a number of pollutants, and this study focuses on
ground-level ozone regulations. While ozone is beneficial in the upper atmosphere,
ground-level ozone presents health risks and is harmful to vegetation. Ground-level
ozone is formed by a chemical reaction between nitrous oxides (NOx) and volatile
organic compounds (VOC) that is caused by sunlight. Thus, ozone regulations focus on
emissions of NOx and VOC. Roughly half of these emissions are generated by electric
power plants and other industrial facilities; the other half of emissions are from motor
vehicles. It is regulations imposed on these sources of pollution in areas with too much
ground-level ozone that alter the regional industrial geography.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After a brief overview of
the Clean Air Act, the existing literature on the impacts of ozone regulation under the
Clean Air Act and extensions to this literature are discussed. Then, two analyses follow;
the first considers impacts on county wide economic indicators, and the second focuses
on manufacturing sector impacts in both cities and counties. These analyses contribute to
the understanding of how the regional industrial landscape by ozone regulations under the
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Clean Air Act. The chapter concludes with a comparison of these two analyses and a
discussion of policy implications.

The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act regulates several pollutants, which are known as criteria
pollutants. National ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) determine the permissible
levels for each criteria pollutant. If a locality fails to meet these standards over a threeyear period, it is subject to being declared a nonattainment area. This determination is not
automatic, but is an administrative decision within the EPA. Once an area is declared to
be in nonattainment, the state is required to develop a state implementation plan, or SIP,
detailing what actions will be taken to meet the NAAQS.
While states are given flexibility in developing SIPs, there are specific
requirements a state implementation plan must meet before it is approved by the EPA.
Technology-based pollution abatement standards are enforced in nonattainment areas that
require existing polluting facilities to use Reasonably Available Control Technology,
which typically involves retrofitting. New polluting facilities are required to use the
technology necessary to attain the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate, regardless of cost.
These requirements are more costly than those for new firms in attainment areas, which
are typically required to use the Best Available Control Technology. These requirements
are negotiated on a case by case basis, and cost is taken into consideration. Thus,
polluting industries located in nonattainment areas face higher pollution abatement costs
than do similar facilities in attainment areas.
Nonattainment areas that satisfy the NAAQS may be reclassified as being in
attainment. When this occurs, the regulatory requirements in the SIP for that particular
locality no longer apply. Instead, a plan for maintaining attainment status is required.
Regulations in this plan need not be as stringent as in the SIP because their purpose is to
maintain, not improve, the present air quality.

Current Literature and Extensions
The current literature details many of the industrial impacts of air quality
regulations. A number of studies have found that Clean Air Act regulations have had a
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real impact on the location of polluting industries. Henderson (1996), Becker and
Henderson (2000), and List and McHone (2000) find that polluting firms consider local
air quality regulations when making location decisions. Henderson (1996) and Becker
and Henderson (2000) observe that ozone nonattainment status reduces firm births in a
county, and List and McHone (2000) find that ozone attainment status affects location
decisions for relocating plants.
Looking beyond firm locations, Becker and Henderson (2000) also find that
nonattainment regulations affect investment and growth patterns in polluting facilities.
Greenstone (2002) finds significant reductions in employment, capital stock, and output
in pollution-intensive industries for nonattainment counties. Pollution abatement
expenditures underlie all of these impacts on polluting industries. Nonattainment
regulations typically result in hundreds of thousands of dollars in abatement costs for
polluting industries (Becker, 2005).
While the current literature describes many of the industrial impacts of ozone
nonattainment under the Clean Air Act, there are still several questions that deserve more
attention. First, it is likely that nonattainment regulations under the Clean Air Act will not
only impact industries in nonattainment areas but also industries located in the
surrounding areas. Regional economic linkages and industry agglomeration may cause
the industrial impacts of nonattainment regulations to extend beyond the borders of
nonattainment areas, producing similar impacts in surrounding areas. Alternatively,
regional economic linkages may encourage the relocation of polluting activity from
nonattainment areas to neighboring jurisdictions that are in attainment. For example, List
et al (2003) observe in their dataset of firm locations in New York that a majority of firm
relocations were to adjacent counties. As mentioned by Greenstone (2002), if this
relocation does occur, studies that only estimate the industrial impact in nonattainment
areas will overstate the regional and national impacts of nonattainment status.
Second, little is known concerning the persistence of nonattainment impacts. It is
important to understand how these impacts change with time as an area continues to be in
nonattainment and whether these impacts persist even after attainment status has been
gained. Concerning the first issue, regulatory impacts likely change with time in
nonattainment areas; it is likely that industrial responses to nonattainment regulations will
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increase as an area continues to be subject to nonattainment regulations and firms can no
longer delay investment or relocation decisions. The extent of these changes is an
important aspect to understanding the industrial impacts of the Clean Air Act. Turning to
the second issue, it is important to understand the persistence of nonattainment status
impacts after attainment status has been gained. Once an area has achieved the national
ambient air quality standards for ground-level ozone and the area is reclassified as being
in attainment, the nonattainment regulations are replaced with new regulations developed
by the state aimed at maintaining attainment status. The new regulations need not cause
the same degree of changes in polluting industries as was caused by the nonattainment
regulations because they are focused on maintaining, not improving, the current air
quality. The removal of nonattainment regulations will likely impact polluting industries,
although the impacts of nonattainment regulations may also persist to some extent
because of the nature of both the former nonattainment regulations and the regulations
replacing them.
Finally, the current literature focuses on impacts on polluting industries but
largely misses the impacts of nonattainment status under the Clean Air Act on aggregate
economic indicators. While it is important to understand the responses of industries
directly affected by nonattainment regulations, analyzing aggregate economic indicators
will shed light on the overall local and regional impacts of nonattainment status.
Estimates of impacts on polluting industries will overstate the net local and regional
impacts of nonattainment status to the degree that reductions in polluting activity are
offset by increases in other industries as labor and capital are reallocated across industries.
Analyzing net economic indicators provides an understanding of how nonattainment
status affect local economies.

Aggregate County Economic Impacts
I use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to estimate the aggregate economic
impacts of ozone attainment status on Ψ , the total number of establishments, total
employment, or total wages in each county. These variables serve as indicators of general
economic activity across industry sectors and include almost all jobs in the U.S.; this data
is summarized in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (BLS Data, All Industries)
Untransformed
Years
Dependent
Included in
Variable
Data
Observations Median
Mean
SD
Number of
County
Establishments 1978-2003
58567
613
2,226
7,623
Governments
Employment 1978-2003
58671
8,583
59,294
265,314
Wages 1978-2003
58567 $196,000 $1,170,000 $4,910,000
Monetary values are in $1,000s of (2000) dollars
Number of Establishment and Employment data are actual values, not 1,000s

This analysis uses the following model to assess the impacts of attainment status:

(

ln (Ψct ) = α + β1 p (Φ ctp ) + β 2 p (Φ ctp ⋅ Yctp ) + β 3 p Φ ctp ⋅ Yctp2

(

+ γ 1 p (Θ ctp ) + γ 2 p (Θ ctp ⋅ Yctp ) + γ 3 p Θ ctp ⋅ Yctp2

(

+ η1 p (φ ctp ) + η 2 p (φ ctp ⋅ Yctp ) + η 3 p φ ctp ⋅ Yctp2

(

)

+ χ 1 p (θ ctp ) + χ 2 p (θ ctp ⋅ Yctp ) + χ 3 p θ ctp ⋅ Yctp2

+ λ ( X ct ) + ε ct

)

)

)

The variables Φ , Θ , φ , and θ comprise a mutually exclusive set of dummy
variables denoting whether a particular county is in nonattainment, has gained attainment
status, is contiguous to a nonattainment county, or is contiguous to a county that has
gained attainment, respectively. The assignment criteria for these categories will be
discussed later. Y indicates the number of years a particular county, c, has been
continuously classified in one of these categories for a particular pollutant p in year t. X
contains a vector of control variables.
The establishment, employment, and wage data in this analysis contains annual
county-level observations covering 1978 through 2003; 1978 was the first year counties
or parts of counties were identified as being in nonattainment under the Clean Air Act. In
2003 some counties created Early Action Compacts to address ozone pollution and avoid
nonattainment status. Because these counties were implementing ozone-related air quality
regulations but were not in nonattainment, I exclude observations from these 99 counties
in 2003 from the analysis. The total county wage data was deflated using the BLS
personal consumption expenditures price index; presumably this index measures what
cost of living wage adjustments are responding to.
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To analyze the persistence of regulatory impacts on nonattainment counties and
the surrounding areas, all counties in the U.S. are partitioned into five groups: those
containing nonattainment areas, those containing areas that have gained attainment, those
contiguous to nonattainment counties, those contiguous to counties that have gained
attainment, and all remaining counties. Figure 3.1 maps counties according to their
assignment to these categories in 2003. Nonattainment designations often follow county
boundaries, and the EPA data used in this analysis is reported according to counties. In
this analysis a county is considered to be in nonattainment if all or part of the county is
listed in nonattainment.
In the above model, Φ , Θ , φ , and θ are dummy variables indicating the
attainment status of each given county, c. Each particular county in each year, t, will only
be in one of these categories or in the reference group of all remaining counties.
Nonattainment counties are identified by Φ , and counties that have gained attainment are
identified by Θ . If a county does not qualify for either of these groups, it then may be
classified as being contiguous to a nonattainment county, φ . Contiguous counties are
determined by a Census Bureau dataset (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1991) that identifies
counties as contiguous if they are physically adjacent, connected by a major road or
bridge, or have significant commuting ties. Because the primary regulatory impact is
expected to arise from nonattainment status and not from gaining attainment status, a
county may be classified as being contiguous to a county that has previously gained
attainment, θ , only if it was not classified in one of the previous groups. Table 3.2
summarizes the sample size by attainment status category.
The county classifications are repeated for each criteria pollutant, p. Greenstone
(2002) highlights the importance of this inclusion; including coefficients only for groundlevel ozone implicitly restricts the regulatory impacts of nonattainment for other criteria
pollutants to zero. However, SIPs addressing other criteria pollutants are expected to have
significant industrial impacts. For example, Gallop and Roberts (1983) find that sulfur
dioxide air quality regulations reduce productivity growth for power plants. Also, many
counties are in nonattainment for more than one criteria pollutant; ignoring the impacts of
regulations for other criteria pollutants incorrectly attributes those impacts to the groundlevel ozone regulations for such counties.
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Figure 3.1: Ground-Level Ozone Attainment Status, 2003

Table 3.2: Sample Size by Attainment Status (BLS Data, All Industries)

County
Governments

Total Observations
Unique Counties
Frequency % of Total Frequency % of Total
Total
58,567
3,050
Nonattainment
7,833
13%
601
20%
Gained Attainment
6,233
11%
458
15%
Contiguous to
Nonattainment
6,993
12%
790
26%
Contiguous to
Gained Attainment
7,651
13%
663
22%
All Other Observations
29,857
51%
538
18%

The dummy variables Φ , Θ , φ , and θ are interacted with Y and Y 2, allowing the
regulatory impact to vary with time1. For counties that are in nonattainment or have
gained attainment, Y indicates the number of consecutive years the county has had that
particular attainment status for criteria pollutant p at time t. For counties labeled as being
contiguous to nonattainment counties or to counties that have gained attainment, Y
indicates the greatest number of years a neighboring county has been in nonattainment or
has maintained attainment after gaining this status.
The vector X ct contains fixed effects for state and year. State fixed effects are
included because SIP regulations are developed by states. The log of both county
population and per capita income for each jurisdiction are included; income data is taken
from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. To control for the industrial and
residential mix within a county, X ct includes the variable “mix”, which is the ratio of
population to employment in the county. Also, to control for urbanization, the log of the
jurisdiction’s population density is included as a control.
Columns (1) through (3) of Table 3.3 list the regression results for each dependent
variable. Within each column, the joint significance for sets of variables is given. I report
the joint significance of each set of policy variables because the regulatory effect is
estimated using each policy variable and both interaction variables jointly; each variable
taken on its own has little value for understanding the overall impact of nonattainment
status. For example, relative to counties that have always been in attainment and that are

1

Modifying the model to only include Y and not Y2 does not significantly alter estimated regulatory impacts.
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2

Gained Attainment * Y (γ2)

Gained Attainment (γ1)

Nonattainment * Y (β3)

2

Nonattainment * Y (β2)

Nonattainment (β1)

*** Significant at the 1% level

** Significant at the 5% level

Joint test: State Fixed Effects
n
2
R

ln (Population Density)

Mix (population/employment)

ln (Per Capita Income)

ln (Population)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ3)

2

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ2)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment (χ1)

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η3)

2

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η2)

Contiguous to Nonattainment (η1)

Gained Attainment * Y (γ3)

Independent Variable

(2)
ln (employment)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1119 ***
(0.0146)
-0.0058 **
***
(0.0026)
***
-0.0002 **
(0.0001)
-0.0859 ***
(0.0136)
0.0012
***
(0.0027)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0777 ***
(0.0127)
-0.0033
***
(0.0026)
*
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0524 ***
(0.0115)
-0.0062 **
***
(0.0025)
**
0.0003 **
(0.0001)
1.2834 ***
(0.0033)
0.724728 ***
(0.010211)
-0.0116 ***
(0.0001)
-0.0393 ***
(0.0032)
***
58,671
0.9626
* Significant at the 10% level

(1)
ln (num estab)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1059 ***
(0.0088)
-0.0011
***
(0.0016)
0.0002 ***
(0.0001)
-0.0624 ***
(0.0083)
0.0020
***
(0.0016)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0932 ***
(0.0077)
-0.0052 ***
***
(0.0016)
***
0.0002 ***
(0.0001)
-0.0623 ***
(0.0069)
-0.0038 **
***
(0.0015)
***
0.0001 *
(0.0001)
0.9979 ***
(0.0020)
0.755715 ***
(0.006199)
-0.0021 ***
(0.0001)
-0.0775 ***
(0.0019)
***
58,567
0.9632

Table 3.3: Regression Results for Counties: Impacts on All Sectors (1978-2003)

1 Hour Ozone NAAQS

(3)
ln (wages)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.0692 ***
(0.0141)
-0.0070 ***
***
(0.0025)
***
0.0003 ***
(0.0001)
-0.0028
(0.0132)
0.0020
(0.0026)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0726 ***
(0.0123)
-0.0055 **
***
(0.0025)
***
0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0451 ***
(0.0111)
-0.0019
***
(0.0024)
0.0001
(0.0001)
1.1631 ***
(0.0032)
0.916983 ***
(0.009874)
-0.0031 ***
(0.0001)
-0.0145 ***
(0.0031)
***
58,567
0.957

only contiguous to counties that have always been in attainment, after 10 years of
nonattainment status total employment in column (2) is expected to change by

[β
[β

(

)] % , or -7.39%. The results of a significance test for

(

)]

1

+ (β 2 ⋅ 10 ) + β 3 ⋅ 10 2

1

+ (β 2 ⋅ 10 ) + β 3 ⋅ 10 2

− [β1 + (β 2 ) + (β 3 )] = 0 , or (9 ⋅ β 2 + 99 ⋅ β 3 ) = 0 , are reported

in the column labeled Y=10 – Y=1. This test indicates whether there is a statistically
significant difference between the expected change in employment between the first and
tenth years of nonattainment. Statistical significance here indicates that the impact of
nonattainment status does vary with time over a ten-year period as a county continues to
have a particular attainment status.
To understand the impact of nonattainment status, it is helpful to graph

β 1 + (β 2 ⋅ Y ) + (β 3 ⋅ Y 2 ) against Y. Figures 3.2 through 3.5 graph this expected impact of
nonattainment status over a ten-year period. These figures only graph the expected
impact when this impact is statistically significant. Of the 7,833 observations of
nonattainment counties, 3,781 observations are for counties that have been in
nonattainment for at least 10 years. Also, 2,680 of the 6,233 observations of counties that
have gained attainment are of counties that had maintained attainment status for at least
ten years. Therefore, analyzing the impact of nonattainment status over a ten-year period
is within the data.
These graphs should be interpreted sequentially; counties are in nonattainment
before they have the opportunity to gain attainment status. To understand the impact of
gaining attainment status, the expected impacts shown in Figure 3.3 should be compared
against those in Figure 3.2. If the expected impacts of nonattainment status and of gaining
attainment status are the same, then the regulatory effects of nonattainment completely
persist after attainment status has been gained.
Figure 3.2 indicates that nonattainment status has a negative impact on the
number of establishments, employment, and total wages in a county. Employment and
total wages also decrease over time in a county as it continues to be in nonattainment.
After ten years of nonattainment status, a 19% reduction in total county employment and
an 11% reduction in total wages is expected.
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Figure 3.2: Economic Impacts for All Sectors for Counties in Nonattainment
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Once attainment status has been gained, the number of establishments and total
employment in a county increase relative to their expected values under nonattainment.
This is seen in Figure 3.3. However, they are still expected to be respectively about 6%
and 8% lower than counties that have never been in nonattainment and are only
contiguous to counties that have always been in attainment. This indicates that gaining
attainment only partially reverses the impacts of nonattainment status. This is likely a
function of the nature of the nonattainment regulations and the regulations that are
implemented to maintain attainment status. It is important for those pursuing local
economic development to understand this partial persistence of economic impacts after
attainment status has been gained. Gaining attainment status will enable greater local
economic development, but it should not be expected to return the local economy to
where it would have been had the county never been in nonattainment.
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Figure 3.3: Economic Impacts for All Sectors for Counties That Have Gained Attainment
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Counties contiguous to nonattainment counties also experience negative economic
impacts from the nonattainment regulations in neighboring counties, as shown in Figure
3.4. It is important to note that the magnitude of the impact in contiguous counties is
similar to that in nonattainment counties. This suggests that nonattainment status has
economic impacts beyond the borders of nonattainment areas because of regional
economic linkages.
Figure 3.5 indicates that similar to counties that gain attainment, those contiguous
to counties that gain attainment experience a partial mitigation of economic impacts. For
example, compared with about an 11% decrease in employment and total wages after ten
years of nonattainment in a neighboring county, employment and total wages are
expected to be respectively 6% and 5% lower when the neighboring county gains
attainment. The persistence of the economic impacts of ground-level ozone regulations
geographically extends beyond nonattainment areas into the surrounding counties.
This analysis follows the trend in the literature by considering counties to be in
nonattainment if all or part of the county contains nonattainment areas. This assignment
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Figure 3.4: Economic Impacts for All Sectors for Counties Contiguous to Counties that
are in Nonattainment
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rule over assigns economic activity to nonattainment areas; some of the facilities in
counties that only partially contain nonattainment areas are outside the nonattainment
boundaries and are not subject to SIP regulations. The above findings that counties
contiguous to nonattainment areas experience economic impacts very similar to the
impacts in nonattainment areas suggest that this over assignment is not a problem. Instead,
the danger lies in under assignment; because nonattainment regulations impact the
surrounding region, the region surrounding nonattainment areas should be included in the
analysis of regulatory impacts. Treating surrounding areas as being unaffected by
nonattainment regulations and including those in the reference group against which
regulatory impacts are compared will cause the regulatory impacts in nonattainment areas
to be understated unless all of the decreases in contiguous counties are offset by increases
in other counties. Also, ignoring the regulatory impacts in jurisdictions surrounding
nonattainment areas will understate the regional and national regulatory impacts of
nonattainment status.
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Figure 3.5: Economic Impacts for All Sectors for Counties Contiguous to Counties That
Have Gained Attainment
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Manufacturing Industry Impacts: Cities and Counties
The preceding analysis describes the aggregate economic impacts of
nonattainment status on counties. Counties are often the unit of analysis in nonattainment
regulatory studies, but they are not the only type of local jurisdiction worth studying.
Cities are often involved in local economic development activities; analyzing the
economic impacts of attainment status on cities is an important part of understanding the
impacts of nonattainment status.
As previously discussed, the current literature largely focuses on polluting
industries. Such analysis captures industry-level impacts by analyzing the responses of
firms directly affected by nonattainment regulations, but it is less suited for
understanding geographically oriented impacts. Instead analysis of impacts aggregated
across industries will better capture local impacts as skilled workers and facilities may
transition from polluting to nonpolluting industries. Such shifts would mitigate the local
impacts of SIP regulations. Furthermore, changes in the industrial geography of polluting
45

industries can be expected to impact related nonpolluting industries in the region.
Regional impacts measured net of changes in both polluting and nonpolluting industries
better describe the economic effects for jurisdiction oriented analysis.
Many polluting industries are in the manufacturing sector, and many interindustry linkages involving polluting industries will be within the manufacturing sector.
To analyze the impacts of attainment status on the manufacturing sector, I use data from
the 1987 and 1992 Economic Censuses. This data permits analysis of changes in total
shipments in addition to changes in employment and wages. After 1992 the Economic
Census switched from the SIC to the NAICS industry classification system, making post1992 data incomparable with data from before the switch. Economic Census data is
reported by both city and county, making city-level analysis possible.
Table 3.4 describes this data. The BLS producer price index for the manufacturing
sector was used to deflate wage and total shipment data2. To avoid disclosure of data for
specific firms, some observations in the Economic Census are censored; the censored
observations are not included in the analysis. Table 3.5 summarizes the sample size by
attainment status. The same model as was used in the previous section is used here to
analyze the Economic Census data. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the results of these fixed
effects regressions.

2

Deflating wage data using the BLS personal consumption expenditures price index that was used to
deflate total county wages in the previous section instead of the producer price index does not alter the
estimated regulatory impacts on total manufacturing wages or production wages.
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Monetary values are in $1,000s of (1984) dollars
Employment data are actual values, not 1,000s

Untransformed Dependent Years Included
Variable
in Data
Observations
Value of Shipments
1987, 1992
4927
Employment
1987, 1992
4789
County Governments
Pay
1987, 1992
4922
Wages
1987, 1992
4909
Value of Shipments
1987, 1992
5019
Municipal
Employment
1987, 1992
5019
Governments
Pay
1987, 1992
5019
Wages
1987, 1992
5018
Median
$183,746
1,800
$30,239
$20,869
$198,216
1,900
$40,630
$23,130

Mean
$885,266
6,801
$168,396
$87,635
$566,585
4,525
$116,570
$57,573

Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (Economic Census Data, Manufacturing Sector Only)

SD
$3,170,000
25,026
$699,679
$312,125
$1,580,000
12,919
$349,015
$147,838
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Municipal
Governments

County
Governments

Total
Nonattainment
Gained Attainment
Contiguous to Nonattainment
Contiguous to Gained Attainment
All Other Observations
Total
Nonattainment
Gained Attainment
Contiguous to Nonattainment
Contiguous to Gained Attainment
All Other Observations

Total Observations
Unique Observations
Manufacturing Only
Manufacturing Only
(1987 & 1992)
(1987 & 1992)
Frequency % of Total Frequency % of Total
4,927
2,650
600
12%
352
13%
546
11%
314
12%
600
12%
402
15%
696
14%
423
16%
2,485
50%
1,159
44%
5,019
2,917
2,408
48%
1,423
49%
703
14%
447
15%
452
9%
321
11%
404
8%
269
9%
1,052
21%
457
16%

Table 3.5: Sample Size by Attainment Status (Economic Census Data, Manufacturing Sector Only)
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2

Gained Attainment * Y (γ2)

Gained Attainment (γ1)

Nonattainment * Y (β3)

2

Nonattainment * Y (β2)

Nonattainment (β1)

*** Significant at the 1% level

** Significant at the 5% level

Joint test: State Fixed Effects
n
2
R

ln (Population Density)

Mix (population/employment)

ln (Per Capita Income)

ln (Population)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ3)

2

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ2)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment (χ1)

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η3)

2

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η2)

Contiguous to Nonattainment (η1)

Gained Attainment * Y (γ3)

Independent Variable

(2)
ln (M employment)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1425
(0.1255)
0.0370
(0.0324)
-0.0021
(0.0018)
-0.1148
(0.1356)
0.0591 *
(0.0336)
-0.0037 *
(0.0020)
-0.0548
(0.1041)
0.0340
*
(0.0278)
-0.0016
(0.0016)
0.0141
(0.0995)
0.0120
(0.0280)
-0.0011
(0.0018)
0.8761 ***
(0.0241)
-0.126121 *
(0.073114)
-0.0714 ***
(0.0033)
0.1867 ***
(0.0231)
***
4,673
0.7669
* Significant at the 10% level

(1)
ln (Manufacturing Shipments)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
0.0839
(0.1864)
-0.0410
*
(0.0482)
0.0014
(0.0027)
-0.1613
(0.2017)
0.0866 *
*
(0.0499)
-0.0052 *
(0.0030)
0.1943
(0.1538)
-0.0254
(0.0408)
0.0011
(0.0023)
-0.1622
(0.1450)
0.0985 **
**
(0.0406)
-0.0069 ***
(0.0026)
1.1178 ***
(0.0340)
0.092951
(0.104000)
-0.0575 ***
(0.0034)
0.2762 ***
(0.0327)
***
4,927
0.7381

(3)
ln (M wages)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
0.0039
(0.1635)
-0.0324
**
(0.0422)
0.0011
(0.0024)
-0.2185
(0.1769)
0.0840 *
(0.0437)
-0.0050 *
(0.0026)
0.0443
(0.1349)
0.0065
(0.0358)
-0.0005
(0.0020)
-0.1041
(0.1279)
0.0685 *
*
(0.0358)
-0.0048 **
(0.0023)
1.0570 ***
(0.0298)
0.281798 ***
(0.091265)
-0.0515 ***
(0.0030)
0.2842 ***
(0.0287)
***
4,922
0.7744

Table 3.6: Regression Results for Counties: Manufacturing Sector Impacts (1987 & 1992)

1 Hour Ozone NAAQS

(4)
ln (M production wages)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.0371
(0.1689)
-0.0269
***
(0.0437)
0.0006
(0.0024)
-0.2272
(0.1828)
0.0823 *
(0.0452)
-0.0048 *
(0.0027)
0.0818
(0.1394)
0.0010
(0.0370)
-0.0003
(0.0021)
-0.0835
(0.1322)
0.0675 *
*
(0.0370)
-0.0050 **
(0.0024)
1.0310 ***
(0.0309)
-0.052742
(0.094467)
-0.0520 ***
(0.0031)
0.2705 ***
(0.0298)
***
4,909
0.7369
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2

Gained Attainment * Y (γ2)

Gained Attainment (γ1)

Nonattainment * Y (β3)

2

Nonattainment * Y (β2)

Nonattainment (β1)

*** Significant at the 1% level

** Significant at the 5% level

Joint test: State Fixed Effects
n
2
R

ln (Population Density)

Mix (population/employment)

ln (Per Capita Income)

ln (Population)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ3)

2

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ2)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment (χ1)

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η3)

2

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η2)

Contiguous to Nonattainment (η1)

Gained Attainment * Y (γ3)

Independent Variable

(2)
ln (M employment)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.0659
(0.1102)
0.0202
(0.0277)
-0.0011
(0.0015)
-0.0157
(0.1168)
-0.0104
(0.0307)
0.0010
(0.0020)
-0.0601
(0.1310)
0.0363
*
(0.0344)
-0.0016
(0.0019)
0.0761
(0.1208)
0.0037
(0.0358)
-0.0009
(0.0024)
0.7073 ***
(0.0112)
-0.081747 *
(0.043906)
-0.1180 ***
(0.0097)
-0.2174 ***
(0.0185)
***
5,019
0.5018
* Significant at the 10% level

(1)
ln (Manufacturing Shipments)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
0.1458
(0.1395)
-0.0057
(0.0351)
0.0001
(0.0019)
0.1372
(0.1479)
-0.0089
(0.0389)
0.0004
(0.0025)
0.0356
(0.1658)
0.0264
**
(0.0435)
-0.0011
(0.0025)
0.0217
(0.1529)
0.0467
(0.0453)
-0.0042
(0.0031)
0.8008 ***
(0.0141)
-0.340016 ***
(0.055620)
-0.1418 ***
(0.0122)
-0.2994 ***
(0.0235)
***
5,019
0.4577

Table 3.7: Regression Results for Cities: Manufacturing Sector Impacts (1987 & 1992)

1 Hour Ozone NAAQS

(3)
ln (M wages)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
0.0435
(0.1220)
0.0039
(0.0306)
-0.0001
(0.0017)
0.0250
(0.1292)
-0.0002
(0.0340)
0.0003
(0.0022)
-0.0442
(0.1449)
0.0441
**
(0.0380)
-0.0021
(0.0022)
0.0788
(0.1337)
0.0185
(0.0396)
-0.0021
(0.0027)
0.7616 ***
(0.0124)
0.180427 ***
(0.048570)
-0.1384 ***
(0.0107)
-0.2337 ***
(0.0205)
***
5,019
0.5196

(4)
ln (M production wages)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
0.0675
(0.1261)
0.0018
(0.0317)
-0.0003
(0.0017)
-0.0074
(0.1336)
0.0010
(0.0351)
0.0003
(0.0023)
-0.0129
(0.1497)
0.0368
**
(0.0393)
-0.0017
(0.0022)
0.0500
(0.1382)
0.0299
(0.0409)
-0.0028
(0.0028)
0.7407 ***
(0.0128)
-0.448338 ***
(0.050253)
-0.1339 ***
(0.0110)
-0.2634 ***
(0.0212)
***
5,018
0.4464

Similar to the impact on all economic sectors in nonattainment counties, Figure
3.6 shows that ground-level ozone nonattainment status has a negative impact on
manufacturing sector output and wages. As would be expected, the wage reductions in
the manufacturing sector are greater than the wage reductions in all sectors combined in
Figure 3.2. Gaining attainment status appears to have a positive impact on shipments
from manufacturing industries but not on wages or employment, as seen in Figure 3.7.
This suggests that the responses of manufacturing firms to the removal of nonattainment
regulations are concentrated in production more than in labor. This result should be taken
with a grain of salt, however; the coefficients for total shipments are jointly only
marginally statistically significant.
Figure 3.6: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Counties in Nonattainment
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Figure 3.7: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Counties That Have Gained Attainment
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Figure 3.8 indicates that manufacturing sector employment increases in counties
contiguous to nonattainment counties. As with total shipments in counties that have
gained attainment status, these results are only marginally statistically significant. Total
wages and total employment should experience similar changes, but wages in counties
contiguous to nonattainment counties are not expected to be affected. Thus, further
analysis with additional data is needed to understand the manufacturing sector impacts in
counties contiguous to nonattainment counties.
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Figure 3.8: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Counties Contiguous to Nonattainment
Counties
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Manufacturing sector shipments and wages benefit from gained attainment status
in a neighboring county, as seen in Figure 3.9. As with impacts on all economic sectors,
similar impacts are seen in counties that gain attainment and in the surrounding counties.
This provides further evidence that regional economic linkages cause the impacts of
nonattainment status to extend beyond the borders of nonattainment areas into the
surrounding region.
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Figure 3.9: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Counties Contiguous to Counties That
Have Gained Attainment
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When analyzing the regulatory impact on the manufacturing sector using cities as
the geographic unit of analysis, a statistically significant regulatory impact is only
observed for cities contiguous to nonattainment counties. As seen in Figure 3.10, in these
cities manufacturing output, employment, and wages are expected to increase with the
removal of nonattainment status in neighboring areas. It is interesting to note that unlike
for counties, these are the only statistically significant impacts for the manufacturing
sector in cities. This suggests that the manufacturing sector impacts are concentrated in
unincorporated areas. Industry agglomeration or infrastructure and public service
advantages in cities may be mitigating the negative impacts of nonattainment regulations.
However, this could also be a result of insufficient data. These estimates are based on two
years of data; city level analysis using more data may produce more descriptive estimates.
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Figure 3.10: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Cities Contiguous to Nonattainment
Counties
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Discussion and Policy Implications
Very similar regulatory impacts are observed in both nonattainment areas and in
surrounding areas. While nonattainment regulations are not applied beyond the borders of
nonattainment areas, regional industry linkages extend the regulatory impacts to
surrounding areas. It is important to understand that attainment status affects the regional
industrial landscape. Regional impacts beyond the borders of nonattainment areas should
be included when analyzing attainment status effects; ignoring these effects will result in
underestimating the total regulatory impacts.
Regional industrial impacts likely also produce regional air quality impacts.
Ground-level ozone regulations are effective in improving local air quality in regulated
areas (Henderson 1996); manufacturing sector activity is seen to increase in cities
surrounding nonattainment areas. It is likely that air quality will decline in these
surrounding areas. Increased ground-level ozone in surrounding areas is expected
because of the manufacturing sector impacts of nonattainment status in neighboring areas.
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The nonattainment regulation literature typically considers a county to be in
nonattainment if all or part of the county is actually included in a nonattainment area.
This apparent over assignment of industrial activity to regulated areas is not problematic,
however, because the industrial regulatory impacts of nonattainment status extend
beyond the nonattainment area. Instead, a problem of under assignment occurs. When
calculating the national impacts of nonattainment regulations, it is important to include
the impacts that occur beyond the boundaries of nonattainment areas.
Analysis of aggregate economic indicators provides an understanding of the local
and regional impacts of attainment status. These impacts are net of changes in the mix of
local industries as an area continues in nonattainment. It is significant that even after a
decade of changes in the local industrial composition, net regulatory impacts are not
reduced. Total employment, total and manufacturing sector wages, the total number of
establishments, and manufacturing shipments are all reduced by nonattainment status net
of local adjustments in industry composition.
Partial persistence of economic impacts is also observed after attainment status
has been gained. Gaining attainment status reverses a portion of the nonattainment status
impacts, but continued economic effects are observed in areas that have gained
attainment status. This is likely caused by both the nature of the SIP regulations in
nonattainment areas and the regulations implemented in areas that have gained attainment
status to maintain that status. These effects provide another piece of the regulatory impact
picture.
These observations lead to several policy suggestions. In light of the fact that
nonattainment status does not merely shift the local industrial composition away from
polluting industries but lowers local net economic indicators, it is important to evaluate
the characteristics of SIP regulations. It may be possible to improve air quality at a
reduced local economic cost. SIP regulations are required to include technology based
standards, which are less efficient than market based regulations. Krupnick and
McConnell (2000) discuss efficiency gains under alternate SIP regulations for NOx, one
of the precursors of ground-level ozone. Implementing more efficient SIP requirements
could mitigate their local economic impacts while still achieving improved air quality.
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While only limited flexibility currently exists for SIP regulations in nonattainment
areas, greater regulatory flexibility is granted for Early Action Compacts. In 2003 the
EPA offered the Early Action Compact, or EAC, as an alternative to communities that
would otherwise likely fail to meet the new 8-hour ozone NAAQS. A successful EAC
will achieve the required air quality improvements sooner than would be required under
nonattainment regulations. Provided that air quality milestones are met, nonattainment
status designation is deferred. Communities participating in Early Action Compacts have
the opportunity to design more efficient air quality regulations, thus mitigating their
economic impacts.
Finally, local economic development efforts should be guided by the
understanding that nonattainment status historically reduces local economic indicators net
of any changes in industrial composition. Employment, wages, and production decrease
with time as an area continues in nonattainment, indicating that any shifts in local
industrial composition are too small to keep up with the impacts on polluting industries
and on firms with close ties to polluting industries. Greater effort to change the local
industrial base could reduce the net local economic costs of nonattainment.
Local economic development in jurisdictions surrounding nonattainment areas
should also address the impacts of nonattainment status. While nonattainment regulations
are not applied to surrounding areas that are in attainment, the regulatory impacts extend
to these areas. Also, gaining attainment status does not remove the need for development
efforts to attract industries unaffected by ozone regulations. Because economic impacts
persist after attainment status has been gained, shifts in the local industrial composition
would be useful in mitigating these persisting economic impacts.
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Chapter 4
The Intergovernmental Fiscal Impacts of the Clean Air Act

Regulatory policy in the U.S. is a mixture of federal, state, and local activity. This
is the case for air quality regulation, which is governed at the federal level by the Clean
Air Act. Localities failing to meet national air quality standards are declared to be in
nonattainment and become subject to additional environmental regulations, which are
implemented by the states. These regulations target polluting industries in specific
localities in an effort to improve local air quality. Firm responses to these additional
regulations will not only alter local patterns of industrial activity, but will also affect the
fiscal realities of local governments.
This chapter focuses on the fiscal impact of ground-level ozone regulation.
Ground-level ozone, a component of smog, presents respiratory health risks and is also
harmful to vegetation. It is formed by a chemical reaction between nitrogen oxides (NOx)
and volatile organic compounds (VOC) that is caused by sunlight; therefore, ground-level
ozone regulations focus on emissions of NOx and VOC. Roughly half of these emissions
are from motor vehicles; most of the remaining emissions are from industrial and electric
generation facilities. The focus of this analysis is to examine the impacts of ozone
regulation on the revenues of local governments – cities and counties – in the
metropolitan areas where these regulations are applied. In addition, recognizing that
regional economies are highly interdependent, this analysis investigates the impacts of
ozone regulations not only on the revenues of jurisdictions directly affected by these
regulations, but also on neighboring localities.
The concept of vertical fiscal externalities, now familiar in the literature of fiscal
federalism (i.e. Keen and Kotsogiannis 2002), is at work in the fiscal impacts of federal
air quality regulations. Vertical fiscal externalities are generally seen when one level of
government uses the same tax base as another level of government. For example, in the
Keen and Kotsogiannis model, local governments set taxes that result in reduced
consumption of the taxed good. This in turn reduces the tax revenue of the national
government. However, the reduction in national tax revenue is not taken into
consideration by local governments when setting tax rates. This chapter considers an
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analogous situation. Under the Clean Air Act, the federal government imposes
regulations that affect the tax bases of local governments. These federally-originated
regulations will therefore impact local tax revenues. The impact of federal regulatory
policies on subnational government revenues is a matter of considerable importance for
those governments. These impacts should also interest federal policymakers and, ideally,
would be taken into account in the formulation of federal regulatory policies. At present,
however, almost nothing is known about the effects of ground-level ozone regulations on
the revenues of local governments. This chapter serves as a positive analysis of these
effects.
A number of studies have found that ozone regulation under the Clean Air Act
does impact polluting industries (i.e. Henderson 1996, Becker and Henderson 2000,
Greenstone 2002, List et al 2003, List and McHone 2000). In general, the literature finds
that ground-level ozone nonattainment status reduces output from and the number of
firms in polluting industries. However, this literature pays little attention to the impacts
on localities immediately adjacent to regulated areas; the study of the impacts of air
quality regulations on jurisdictions neighboring regulated areas is a contribution of this
chapter aimed at understanding the regional regulatory impacts. Responses by polluting
industries both in and surrounding regulated areas will impact the tax bases of local
governments.
Ground-level ozone regulations do result in improvements in local air quality (i.e.
Henderson 1996). Clean air is an amenity, and ceteris paribus, localities with cleaner air
are expected to be more desirable places to live. Increases in amenities via air quality
regulations will be capitalized in property values, and this capitalization in turn impacts
property tax revenues. Thus, while taxed industrial activity decreases in nonattainment
areas putting downward pressure on tax revenues, the amenity of cleaner air can create
upward pressure on revenues. The net impact on local tax revenues is a composite of
these differing tax base influences.
One would expect, a priori, that various types of governmental units are affected
differently by the Clean Air Act. For example, cities and counties in the same
nonattainment area have different tax bases that may be impacted differently by the
additional regulations in nonattainment areas. The regulatory impact on polluting
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industries will have a greater impact on local governments with tax bases more reliant on
polluting industries.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I begin with a discussion of
the Clean Air Act and its implementation, followed with a discussion of the existing
literature on industrial impacts of the Clean Air Act and several extensions to this
literature. I then develop an empirical model to test the intergovernmental fiscal effects of
the Clean Air Act and describe the data used in this analysis. I find that nonattainment
status depresses tax revenues in urban centers but results in higher revenues in outlying
areas. These fiscal impacts persist after attainment status has been gained, and these
revenue changes are reflected in similar changes in current expenditures; ground-level
nonattainment status has lasting impacts on local public service provision. I conclude by
discussing implications for important public policy questions and directions for future
research.

Air Quality Policy and Implementation
The Clean Air Act Amendments have created national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) which apply to specific pollutants, known as criteria pollutants.
These standards are applied at the local level, and localities failing to meet the standards
over a three year period are declared to be nonattainment areas. Based on air quality
measurements, attainment status is determined independently for each pollutant. A list of
nonattainment counties is published each year in the Federal Register.
Once an area is declared to be in nonattainment, the state is required to submit a
state implementation plan (SIP) outlining what actions will be taken to achieve the
ambient air quality standards. Localities are declared as nonattainment areas for specific
pollutants; corresponding state implementation plans address the polluting sources that
contribute the pollutants exceeding the air quality standard.
State implementation plans create additional regulations for industries that are
located within nonattainment areas. The EPA gives states some discretion in determining
what will be done to improve air quality, so the specific regulatory impacts of a SIP will
have some variation across states. This variation notwithstanding, industries will be
affected when an area is declared to be in nonattainment.
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Existing facilities in nonattainment areas are required to use Reasonably
Available Control Technology, which typically involves retrofitting. New facilities in
nonattainment areas face the stricter requirement of the Lowest Achievable Emission
Rate, regardless of cost. To prevent large air quality deterioration in attainment areas,
many new facilities in most attainment areas are also subject to air quality regulation;
such facilities are required to use the Best Available Control Technology. These specific
technology requirements are negotiated on a case by case basis, and cost is taken into
consideration. Thus, firms located in nonattainment areas face stricter regulations than do
firms in attainment areas.
While the EPA sets the air quality standards, state and local governments are
responsible for monitoring and enforcement. Federal penalties add weight to state and
local enforcement efforts. Federal regulators also have an indirect role in monitoring and
enforcement. The EPA must approve SIPs, and it has the authority to impose additional
regulations if a SIP fails to bring an area into compliance with the NAAQS. Nadeau
(1997) finds that plant-level monitoring does lead to effective enforcement of air quality
regulations; implementation of air quality regulations does have real impacts on polluting
firms.

Existing Literature and Extensions
A number of studies examine the industrial impacts of environmental regulations.
One branch of this literature evaluates the location decisions of firms. Henderson (1996)
and List and McHone (2000) find that air quality regulations affect firm location
decisions. Firms make location decisions when opening a new facility or relocating an
existing plant. Henderson (1996) finds that nonattainment status under the Clean Air Act
reduces firm births in a county, and List et al (2003) find that air quality regulations
affect location decisions for relocating plants.
A few studies have considered impacts other than firm location decisions.
Greenstone (2002) finds that nonattainment status reduces employment, capital stock, and
output in pollution-intensive industries, and Gallop and Roberts (1983) find that air
quality regulations reduce productivity growth for power plants. While environmental
regulations appear to have a number of significant industrial impacts, there is little
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evidence that environmental regulations have reduced the international competitiveness
of U.S. firms. For a survey of this literature, see Jaffe et al (1995).
While the existing literature focuses on industrial impacts of nonattainment status
under the Clean Air Act, there are several important questions that this literature does not
address. In particular, little attention has been paid to the effects of gaining attainment
status, the impacts in localities contiguous to nonattainment areas, or the fiscal impacts of
attainment status on local governments.
Extensions for the Existing Literature
Once an area gains attainment status, the additional environmental regulations
that had been imposed are no longer required by the Clean Air Act. However, the effect
of these regulations may persist after they have been removed. The purpose of the
temporary additional regulations created by the SIP is to bring the area into sustained
compliance with the ambient air quality standards. Thus, the impact of a successful SIP
on local industrial activity may extend beyond the life of the SIP, either because of the
nature of the temporary regulations, or because the SIP regulations are replaced with
other state or local regulations to maintain compliance. However, there is no necessary
theoretical reason to expect the regulatory effects to fully persist after attainment status
has been gained. Even when jurisdictions maintain additional regulations to avoid future
nonattainment status, such regulations are not subject to the same specific EPA
requirements that govern SIPs. For example, SIPs must include technology-based
standards; those standards could be replaced with more flexible regulations once
attainment status has been gained, mitigating some of the SIP impacts on polluting firms.
Also, once attainment status has been gained, regulations are focused on maintaining
rather than improving air quality. Maintenance of current pollution levels is expected to
be less costly than the reduction of pollution levels.
Empirical research on the Clean Air Act has focused on regulatory effects in
nonattainment counties. While I extend this understanding by examining the affects of
gaining attainment status, I also consider the regulatory effects on localities that are
contiguous to nonattainment areas. The regulatory impact on polluting industries may or
may not be the same as in nonattainment areas. Local economic linkages and industry
agglomeration may produce similar impacts in regions surrounding nonattainment areas,
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or polluting industries may relocate from nonattainment jurisdictions to surrounding areas
that are still in attainment to escape the nonattainment regulations. For example, List et al
(2003) observe in their dataset of firm locations in New York that a majority of firm
relocations were to adjacent counties. Also, the air quality improvements in
nonattainment areas will spill over to adjacent areas; these adjacent areas are expected to
experience some air quality improvements unless polluting activity relocates into these
areas. Air quality improvements would be capitalized in property values and reflected in
property tax revenues. Thus, localities near to nonattainment areas may experience
revenue changes that are either similar to or opposite from changes observed in the
neighboring nonattainment areas. There is no a priori expectation for the fiscal impacts of
nonattainment status for local governments in the surrounding attainment areas.

Empirical Model and Data
This analysis partitions all counties in the U.S. into five groups: those containing
nonattainment areas, those containing areas that have gained attainment, those contiguous
to nonattainment counties, those contiguous to counties that have gained attainment, and
all remaining counties. To illustrate, Figure 4.1 gives a snapshot of these areas in 2002.
This analysis includes data covering 1978 through 2002; 1978 was the first year specific
counties were identified as being out of attainment for the criteria pollutants.
To assess the affects of attainment status on local government revenues and
expenditures I use the following model:

(

2
ln (Ψ jt ) = α + β 1 p (Φ jtp ) + β 2 p (Φ jtp ⋅ Y jtp ) + β 3 p Φ jtp ⋅ Y jtp

(

2
+ γ 1 p (Θ jtp ) + γ 2 p (Θ jtp ⋅ Y jtp ) + γ 3 p Θ jtp ⋅ Y jtp

(

2
+ η1 p (φ jtp ) + η 2 p (φ jtp ⋅ Y jtp ) + η 3 p φ jtp ⋅ Y jtp

(

)

2
+ χ 1 p (θ jtp ) + χ 2 p (θ jtp ⋅ Y jtp ) + χ 3 p θ jtp ⋅ Y jtp

+ λ (X jt ) + ε jt

)

)

)

In this model, Ψ jt is the fiscal variable of interest for local government j at time t:
total revenue, own source revenue, total current expenditures, and property tax revenue.
The variables Φ , Θ , φ , and θ comprise a mutually exclusive set of dummy variables
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Figure 4.1: Ground-Level Ozone Attainment Status, 2002

denoting whether a particular county or the county containing a particular city is in
nonattainment, has gained attainment status, is contiguous to a nonattainment county, or
is contiguous to a county that has gained attainment, respectively. The assignment of
counties to these categories will be discussed later. Y indicates the number of years a
particular county, c, has been continuously classified in one of these categories for a
particular pollutant p in year t. X contains a vector of control variables.
The local government fiscal data used in this analysis is available from the Census
Bureau’s Census of Governments for 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. Total current
expenditures, which excludes capital expenditures, is used instead of total expenditures
because capital expenditures are often lumpy over time; current expenditures more
closely reflect current public service delivery. The revenue variables were deflated using
the Bureau of Economic Analysis price index for GDP, and government expenditures
were deflated using the Bureau of Economic Analysis price index for state and local
government consumption expenditures. Table 4.1 summarizes this data by government
type.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Fiscal Data
Untransformed Dependent
Variable
Observations
Total Revenue
14,929
Total Own Source Revenue
14,929
County Governments
Total Current Expenditures
14,927
Property Tax Revenue
14,907
Total Revenue
92,177
Municipal
Total Own Source Revenue
91,749
Governments
Total Current Expenditures
91,868
Property Tax Revenue
84,251

Median
11,403
7,265
10,628
3,062
616
454
527
96

Mean
59,025
37,174
55,319
14,724
13,858
10,626
12,347
2,545

SD
298,419
159,977
283,802
65,442
370,662
249,046
348,803
61,809

The local governments affected by these regulations include not only county
governments, but also the other local governments found within a county, including
municipal governments. Counties are the relevant geographic units of analysis in that
they are the units to which regulations are often applied, but they are not the sole or nor
necessarily the most interesting political units of analysis when assessing fiscal impacts.
Therefore, this analysis considers the fiscal impacts on cities in addition the impacts on
county governments.
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In this analysis, local governments are assigned the attainment status of the
county they are located within. The fiscal effects for governments in nonattainment
counties and in counties that were in nonattainment but have since gained attainment
status are estimated. Specifically, Φ jtp is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the county
containing local government j had nonattainment status in year t for pollutant p, and Θ jtp
is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the county containing local government j had gained
attainment status prior to year t for pollutant p. The reference group for governments that
are in nonattainment counties and that are in counties that have gained attainment status
is local governments located in counties that have never been in nonattainment and have
never been contiguous to a nonattainment county; SIP regulations have not affected the
counties in the reference group.
2
Departing from the existing literature, Φ and Θ are interacted with Y jtp and Y jtp
,

where Y jtp is the number of years of continuous attainment or nonattainment for the
county containing local government j in year t for pollutant p1. One would not expect the
fiscal effects of air quality regulations to be instantaneous or constant over time. After a
SIP has been developed and implemented, air quality regulations are expected to have
greater local impacts over time as existing facilities make new investments and are
required to comply with tighter regulations. Also, facility relocation in response to SIP
regulations is not immediate; these decisions are made over time as a county continues to
be in nonattainment. This is why it is important to permit the fiscal impacts of attainment
status to change over time in the model. This model specification allows a constant or
parabolic relationship between the number of years a county has had a given attainment
status and the impact of the status on the fiscal variable of interest.
Nonattainment status for each county in the U.S. was obtained from the EPA.
Many nonattainment designations follow county boundaries, and the EPA reports
nonattainment status according to counties. In the dataset used in this analysis a county is
considered to be in nonattainment if all or part of the county is listed in nonattainment.
Table 4.2 lists the number of governments used in this analysis by attainment status.

1

Modifying the model to only include Y and not Y2 does not significantly alter estimated regulatory fiscal
impacts.
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Table 4.2: Sample Size by Attainment Status (1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 Data)

County
Governments

Municipal
Governments

Total
Nonattainment
Gained Attainment
Contiguous to Nonattainment
Contiguous to Gained Attainment
All Other Observations
Total
Nonattainment
Gained Attainment
Contiguous to Nonattainment
Contiguous to Gained Attainment
All Other Observations

Total Observations
Frequency % of Total
14,929
1,500
10%
1,574
11%
1,496
10%
2,253
15%
8,106
54%
93,540
19,338
21%
12,441
13%
8,489
9%
13,532
14%
39,740
42%

In the model, φ jtp indicates whether the county containing local government j was
contiguous to a nonattainment county in year t for pollutant p, and θ jtp indicates whether
the county containing local government j was contiguous to a county that had gained
attainment status prior to year t for pollutant p. This analysis uses a dataset from the
Census Bureau (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1991) that defines contiguous counties to be
those that are physically adjacent, connected by a major road or bridge, or have
significant commuting ties. If a local government is in a county that is contiguous to a
nonattainment county, it is considered to be contiguous to the nonattainment county.
2
Like Φ and Θ , φ and θ are also interacted with Y jtp and Y jtp
. In this analysis if

a local government is contiguous to more than one nonattainment county, the number of
years of continuous nonattainment status is recorded for the contiguous county that has
been in nonattainment for the greatest number of years. Likewise, for local governments
contiguous to multiple counties that have gained attainment status, the number of
continuous years of attainment status is recorded for the contiguous county that has been
in attainment for the longest time.
A local government may be considered contiguous to a nonattainment county or
to a county that has gained attainment status, but not both in this analysis. The primary
regulatory effect in a region occurs because of nonattainment status; gaining attainment
status is expected to have a smaller, secondary impact on local industry. Because
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nonattainment status is expected to produce the primary regulatory effect in a region, if a
local government is contiguous to a nonattainment county and to a county that has gained
attainment status, it is recorded as simply being contiguous to a nonattainment county.
Also, counties that are in nonattainment or that have gained attainment are not also
recorded as being contiguous to areas in nonattainment or that have gained attainment.
This partitions all counties into five distinct categories: those that contain nonattainment
areas, those that have gained attainment, those that are contiguous to a nonattainment
county, those that are contiguous to a county that has gained attainment, and all
remaining counties. Therefore, the reference group for local governments contiguous to
nonattainment counties and contiguous to counties that have gained attainment status is
all local governments in counties that have never been in nonattainment and that are only
contiguous to counties that have never been in nonattainment.
Greenstone (2002) explains that including coefficients for each criteria pollutant
in the model is valuable. When considering the effect of attainment status for a particular
pollutant, the effect of attainment status for the other criteria pollutants is not restricted to
zero when the model includes all criteria pollutants. This is important because many
nonattainment counties are out of attainment for multiple pollutants. β p , γ p , η p , and χ p
are all vectors containing coefficients for each criteria pollutant regulated between 1978
and 2002: 1 hour ozone, carbon monoxide, lead, particulate matter smaller than 10
microns, nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and total suspended particulates.
In the model, X jt is a vector of control variables. These include state fixed
effects because SIPs are developed at the state level. Fixed effects for nonattainment
status ( Φ , Θ , φ , and θ ) by year are included for each criteria pollutant to account for
national industry-wide characteristics in polluting industries that change over time. Year
fixed effects are also included.
The revenue estimation literature highlights the importance of controlling for
population and income (i.e. Groves and Kahn 1952, Legler and Shapiro 1968, and
Buchanan and Weber 1982). X jt includes the log of population and per capita income
estimates for counties and cities. City population data is taken from the Census of
Governments, and annual county population estimates are from the Census Bureau
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Population Division. Per capita income for each city and county is also included and is
taken from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. Because income data
summarized by cities and counties is only available based on the decennial census, the
Census of Governments data is matched with the temporally closest income data.
To control for the industrial and residential mix within a county, X jt includes the
variable “mix”, which is the ratio of population to employment in the county. County
employment data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Also, to control for fiscal
characteristics, the log of the jurisdiction’s population density is included as a control;
higher population densities are expected to reduce service delivery costs.

Results

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 list selected coefficient estimates for cities and counties.
Because these types of governments have different tax bases and functions, it was
important to estimate the model separately for each type of government. Using this
approach instead of using a dummy variable for each government type allows all of the
coefficients to vary between government types; this variation captures how the Clean Air
Act affects each type of local government differently.
Columns (1) through (4) in each table give the regression results for each
dependent variable. Within each column, the joint significance for sets of variables is
given. I report the joint significance of each set of policy variables because the fiscal
effect is estimated using each policy variable and both interaction variables jointly; each
variable taken on its own has little value for understanding the overall intergovernmental
fiscal impact of the Clean Air Act. For example, relative to counties that have always
been in attainment and that are contiguous to counties that have always been in
attainment, total revenues for counties that have been in nonattainment for three years are
expected to change by β 1 + (β 2 ⋅ 3) + (β 3 ⋅ 3 2 ) %, or -9.53%; this is seen from column (1)

[

]

of Table 4.4. The results of a significance test for β 1 + (β 2 ⋅ 10 ) + (β 3 ⋅ 10 2 ) −

[β1 + (β 2 ) + (β 3 )]

= 0 , or (9 ⋅ β 2 + 99 ⋅ β 3 ) = 0 , are also reported in the column labeled

Y=10 – Y=1. This test indicates whether the expected fiscal effects after 10 years are
statistically significantly different than the expected fiscal effects in the first year.
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2

Gained Attainment * Y (γ2)

Gained Attainment (γ1)

Nonattainment * Y (β3)

2

Nonattainment * Y (β2)

Nonattainment (β1)

*** Significant at the 1% level

92,177
0.8695

** Significant at the 5% level

Joint test: State Fixed Effects
Joint test: Ozone Attainment Status by Year
n
2
R

ln (Population Density)

Mix (population/employment)

ln (Per Capita Income)

ln (Population)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ3)

2

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ2)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment (χ1)

2

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η3)

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η2)

Contiguous to Nonattainment (η1)

Gained Attainment * Y (γ3)

Independent Variable

91,749
0.8561

(2)
ln (Own Source Revenue)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1613 ***
(0.0444)
-0.0073
***
(0.0057)
0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.2170 ***
(0.0246)
-0.0041
***
(0.0048)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0402
(0.0688)
-0.0043
(0.0081)
0.0001
(0.0003)
-0.0680 ***
(0.0230)
-0.0048
***
(0.0046)
0.0001
(0.0002)
1.3057 ***
(0.0024)
0.472433 ***
(0.010012)
-0.0006
(0.0005)
-0.0216 ***
(0.0038)
***

* Significant at the 10% level

(1)
ln (Total Revenue)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1433 ***
(0.0390)
-0.0041
***
(0.0050)
0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.1999 ***
(0.0216)
-0.0021
***
(0.0042)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0262
(0.0604)
-0.0019
(0.0071)
0.0000
(0.0003)
-0.0597 ***
(0.0202)
-0.0017
***
(0.0040)
0.0001
(0.0002)
1.2567 ***
(0.0021)
0.320041 ***
(0.008763)
-0.0005
(0.0005)
-0.0396 ***
(0.0033)
***

Table 4.3: Regression Results for Cities

1 Hour Ozone NAAQS

91,868
0.8645

(3)
ln (Current Expenditures)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1753 ***
(0.0405)
-0.0081
***
(0.0052)
0.0003 *
(0.0002)
-0.1983 ***
(0.0224)
-0.0065
***
(0.0043)
*
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0536
(0.0629)
0.0026
(0.0074)
-0.0002
(0.0003)
-0.0538 **
(0.0209)
-0.0055
***
(0.0042)
0.0002
(0.0002)
1.2661 ***
(0.0022)
0.298285 ***
(0.009109)
-0.0004
(0.0005)
-0.0240 ***
(0.0035)
***

(4)
ln (Property Tax)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
0.0303
(0.0393)
0.0030
***
(0.0050)
0.0000
(0.0002)
-0.0597 ***
(0.0218)
-0.0037
***
(0.0042)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.1965 ***
(0.0631)
0.0009
**
(0.0074)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
-0.0712 ***
(0.0208)
0.0009
***
(0.0042)
0.0000
(0.0002)
1.1951 ***
(0.0022)
0.812225 ***
(0.009142)
0.0002
(0.0005)
-0.0632 ***
(0.0036)
***
***
84,251
0.8292
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2

Gained Attainment * Y (γ2)

Gained Attainment (γ1)

Nonattainment * Y (β3)

2

Nonattainment * Y (β2)

Nonattainment (β1)

*** Significant at the 1% level

14,929
0.7139

** Significant at the 5% level

Joint test: State Fixed Effects
Joint test: Ozone Attainment Status by Year
n
2
R

ln (Population Density)

Mix (population/employment)

ln (Per Capita Income)

ln (Population)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ3)

2

Contiguous to Gained Attainment * Y (χ2)

Contiguous to Gained Attainment (χ1)

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η3)

2

Contiguous to Nonattainment * Y (η2)

Contiguous to Nonattainment (η1)

Gained Attainment * Y (γ3)

Independent Variable

(2)
ln (Own Source Revenue)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1720 *
(0.0926)
0.0250 **
***
(0.0120)
***
-0.0001
(0.0005)
0.1884 ***
(0.0474)
-0.0047
***
(0.0088)
0.0001
(0.0004)
-0.0219
(0.0971)
0.0031
***
(0.0117)
0.0002
(0.0005)
-0.0505
(0.0362)
0.0068
(0.0073)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
0.9065 ***
(0.0107)
1.167191 ***
(0.032787)
-0.0009 ***
(0.0003)
-0.1374 ***
(0.0105)
***
*
14,929
0.7161
* Significant at the 10% level

(1)
ln (Total Revenue)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1722 **
(0.0769)
0.0276 ***
***
(0.0100)
***
-0.0001
(0.0004)
0.1419 ***
(0.0394)
-0.0056
***
(0.0073)
0.0001
(0.0003)
-0.0119
(0.0806)
-0.0007
***
(0.0097)
0.0003
(0.0004)
-0.0605 **
(0.0301)
0.0089
(0.0061)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
0.8994 ***
(0.0089)
0.747634 ***
(0.027223)
-0.0006 ***
(0.0002)
-0.1524 ***
(0.0088)
***

Table 4.4: Regression Results for Counties

1 Hour Ozone NAAQS

14,927
0.7088

(3)
ln (Current Expenditures)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
-0.1344 *
(0.0779)
0.0180 *
***
(0.0101)
***
0.0003
(0.0004)
0.1416 ***
(0.0399)
-0.0072
***
(0.0074)
0.0002
(0.0003)
-0.0385
(0.0817)
0.0021
***
(0.0099)
0.0003
(0.0004)
-0.0436
(0.0305)
0.0061
(0.0061)
-0.0002
(0.0003)
0.8916 ***
(0.0090)
0.655309 ***
(0.027577)
-0.0007 ***
(0.0002)
-0.1382 ***
(0.0089)
***
14,907
0.7069

(4)
ln (Property Tax)
Significance
Coefficient
Joint Y=10 (Std. Err.)
Test Y=1
0.0396
(0.0752)
0.0195 **
***
(0.0098)
***
-0.0002
(0.0004)
0.1253 ***
(0.0385)
0.0038
***
(0.0072)
-0.0001
(0.0003)
0.1132
(0.0788)
-0.0033
***
(0.0095)
0.0002
(0.0004)
-0.0925 ***
(0.0295)
0.0159 ***
**
(0.0059)
***
-0.0006 **
(0.0002)
0.8576 ***
(0.0087)
1.138569 ***
(0.026642)
0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.1368 ***
(0.0086)
***

Significance indicates that the fiscal effect of that particular attainment status does
change over a ten-year period.
To understand how the fiscal effects change with time, it is useful to graph the
expected fiscal impact across time. For example, to graph the impact of nonattainment
status on total revenue, plot of β 1 + (β 2 ⋅ Y ) + (β 3 ⋅ Y 2 ) against Y. To understand how the
impact changes with time, the difference in the expected revenue changes between the

[

(

)]

first and tenth years can be calculated: β1 + (β 2 ⋅ Y ) + β 3 ⋅ Y 2 − [β1 + (β 2 ) + (β 3 )] .
Figures 4.2 through 4.9 graph the expected impact on revenues or expenditures,
such as β 1 + (β 2 ⋅ Y ) + (β 3 ⋅ Y 2 ) , when the regulatory impact on expected revenues or
expenditures is statistically significant; these graphs show the regulatory impact for each
attainment status on each of the fiscal dependent variables. Each graph covers a ten-year
period. Of the 468 counties that have contained nonattainment areas between 1978 and
2002, 322 have been in nonattainment for a period of ten or more years. Also, 290 of the
388 counties that have gained attainment status have subsequently maintained attainment
for ten or more years. Thus, estimating the regulatory impact over a ten-year period is
within the data.
These graphs should be interpreted in sequence; local governments are in
nonattainment before gaining attainment, so when extrapolated to a particular
government, graphs for nonattainment areas temporally precede graphs for areas that
have gained attainment status. This is important when considering the persistence of
nonattainment impacts. For example, an absence of change between the graphs for
nonattainment areas and for areas that have gained attainment would mean that the fiscal
changes shown in the nonattainment graph persist after attainment status has been gained.
Before discussing specific findings, some key geographic differences between the
types of governments included this analysis should be highlighted. Counties typically do
not follow urban boundaries; urban, suburban, and rural areas can all be found in one
county. While regulations can benefit the entire local area via air quality improvements,
the costs of regulations targeted at polluting industries are concentrated in more
industrialized areas. Analysis at the county level will aggregate the regulatory fiscal
impact across all areas in a county, both urban and rural. Cities, however, are
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incorporated in population centers. Because outlying areas surrounding cities are often
not incorporated, analysis at the city level will capture the regulatory fiscal impacts in
more urban areas. The qualitative fiscal impacts in rural areas can then be understood by
“subtracting” the impacts in cities from the impacts in counties. Because cities and
counties rely on different mixes of taxes, this comparison is most meaningful for a
specific type of tax, such as the property tax. Nonattainment status is expected to impact
the tax bases for various taxes differently; thus, it will affect the total revenues of each
type of local government differently. For example, counties rely more heavily on
property taxes than do cities; in the data used in this analysis, on average property taxes
comprise 31% of total county revenues and 19% of total city revenues.
As indicated in Figure 4.2, nonattainment status results in reduced total and own
source revenues for city governments located in counties containing nonattainment areas.
After 10 years of nonattainment, total revenues have fallen by 18%. SIP regulations on
Figure 4.2: Fiscal Effects for Cities in Nonattainment Counties
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Property Tax Revenue

polluting activity appear to reduce the positive impact of this polluting activity on tax
revenues.
For cities, the fiscal effects of nonattainment status persist after attainment status
has been gained. This is seen in Figure 4.3. Instead of returning to their prenonattainment levels, revenues and expenditures continue to be lower. This indicates that
gaining attainment status in urban or suburban areas is associated with continued
downward fiscal impacts.
In contrast to cities, Figure 4.4 shows that tax revenue increases for counties
while in nonattainment. This suggests that while tax revenue collection is reduced in
urbanized areas, more money is collected in outlying areas; counties in nonattainment
then gain more tax revenue from outlying areas than they lose in tax revenues from
incorporated areas. On net, unincorporated outlying areas appear to benefit from
nonattainment status as evidenced by this apparent increase in tax revenue collection.
Figure 4.3: Fiscal Effects for Cities in Counties That Have Gained Attainment
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Figure 4.4: Fiscal Effects for Counties in Nonattainment
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Figure 4.4 shows a statistically significant and large increase in total revenues
across time; during ten years of nonattainment, total county revenues are expected to
increase 24%. At the beginning of this period, total revenues were 15% lower than
revenues in the reference group; the increase in revenues during the nonattainment period
more than makes up for this. Areas surrounding urban population centers appear to
significantly benefit fiscally from nonattainment status. These increases could reflect
economic development as polluting industries relocate to outlying areas that have cleaner
air. The property tax revenue increases could also reflect the capitalization of air quality
improvements into land values. Outlying areas are typically residential and agricultural
where clean air is an amenity; air quality improvements make these areas more desirable.
Figure 4.5 illustrates that after rising during nonattainment, revenues and
expenditures remain at higher levels once attainment status has been gained; the increases
observed during nonattainment persist after attainment status has been gained. A decade
after attainment status has been gained total revenues and current expenditures are still
experiencing positive impacts from the local air quality regulations. It is interesting to
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Figure 4.5: Fiscal Effects for Counties That Have Gained Attainment
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note that the expected fiscal changes over the first decade of attainment status are smaller
in magnitude than the changes experienced during the nonattainment period. For example,
while total revenues are expected to increase 24% over ten years of nonattainment, they
are not expected to experience statistically significant changes during the ten years
following the gaining of attainment status. This indicates that regulations employed to
maintain attainment status have a smaller fiscal impact at the county level than do the
regulations required by the EPA to bring an area into compliance with the ground-level
ozone NAAQS. This is likely because regulations in attainment areas are less stringent
than those in nonattainment areas; once attainment status has been gained, the current air
quality only needs to be maintained instead of improved.
Turning attention to jurisdictions contiguous to nonattainment areas, I find
statistically significant impacts on city and county government finances. Figures 4.6 and
4.7 show a large increase in property tax revenues for jurisdictions near nonattainment
areas. This increase indicates that outlying areas are more desirable; this could occur as
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Figure 4.6: Fiscal Effects for Cities Contiguous to Nonattainment Counties
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polluting industries relocate to nearby areas that do not face nonattainment regulations or
as individuals prefer to live in surrounding areas with cleaner air.
The fiscal impacts for counties contiguous to nonattainment areas as shown in
Figure 4.7 are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 4.4 for nonattainment counties.
However, it is interesting to note that the impacts on total revenues, own source revenues,
and current expenditures are much smaller in magnitude in Figure 4.7. As discussed
above, the increases observed in Figure 4.4 for nonattainment counties are driven by
revenues collected in unincorporated areas. The smaller effects in Figure 4.7 for counties
contiguous to nonattainment areas suggest that the fiscal impacts of nonattainment
regulations diminish with distance from the urban core.
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Figure 4.7: Fiscal Effects for Counties Contiguous to Nonattainment Counties
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Figure 4.8 also tells a similar story, but for cities contiguous to counties that have
gained attainment. The negative impacts for total revenue, own source revenue, and
current expenditures are much smaller in magnitude when compared to Figure 4.3
showing the fiscal effects for cities located in counties that have gained attainment. The
fiscal effects of gaining attainment status appear to diminish with distance from regulated
areas. Also, outlying cities do not fare as well as unincorporated areas. Figure 4.5 shows
positive impacts for counties that have gained attainment status; again, qualitatively
subtracting the negative effects for cities in Figure 4.3 indicates that the positive impacts
for counties are driven by impacts in unincorporated areas. Outlying cities likely see
negative, albeit small, fiscal impacts from the removal of nonattainment status in nearby
counties because they no longer have as large of a regulatory environment advantage
over the formerly regulated central cities.
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Figure 4.8: Fiscal Effects for Cities Contiguous to Counties that have Gained Attainment
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The loss of regulatory advantage also affects county property tax revenues. These
revenues fall when a neighboring county gains attainment, as seen in Figure 4.9. This
reduction is largely temporary, however. Compared with county property tax revenues
after ten years of nonattainment in a contiguous county, these revenues are expected to be
18% lower when the contiguous county gains attainment; after ten years of attainment in
the neighboring county, property tax revenues are only 9% lower than during
nonattainment in the contiguous county. This indicates that while the removal of
nonattainment status appears to hurt economic development in surrounding counties, this
particular negative impact is temporary.
Finally, this analysis indicates that local governments do not use debt financing or
changes in expenditures on capital projects to smooth expenditure changes associated
with revenue shifts resulting from ground-level ozone regulations. Instead, total revenues
and current expenditures tend to rise and fall together. This is not surprising, as this
relationship between revenues and expenditures is observed for general revenue shocks
by Buettner and Wildasin (2006). Consistent with expenditure responses to other revenue
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Figure 4.9: Fiscal Effects for Counties Contiguous to Counties That Have Gained
Attainment
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shocks, revenue changes associated with ground-level ozone regulations result in similar
changes in current expenditures. Thus, nonattainment status has a real impact on public
service delivery. Whether or not local governments anticipate the revenue changes
associated with nonattainment status, they do not maintain current public service
expenditure levels when in nonattainment for ground-level ozone.

Discussion and Policy Implications

The fiscal impacts of ground-level ozone attainment status vary according to
geography. Nonattainment status results in revenue decreases in population centers where
compliance costs are concentrated. This is evident in the analysis of city revenues.
Revenues in outlying areas increase in the presence of nonattainment status, and these
increases diminish with distance from the urban core. There are two likely causes behind
these observations. Nonattainment regulations are applied throughout the nonattainment
area, but compliance costs are not expected to be concentrated in outlying areas because
polluting activity is most concentrated in urbanized areas. While outlying areas
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experience lower compliance costs, the regulatory benefits of cleaner air make outlying
areas more desirable; the amenity of cleaner air would be capitalized in property values.
Also, taxed industrial activity could migrate from urban centers with concentrated
pollution to outlying areas. These increases in industrial activity in outlying areas would
also lead to higher commercial or industrial property values.
Even after attainment status has been gained, the fiscal effects of the
nonattainment regulations persist in regulated areas. The lower revenues for cities and the
higher revenues for counties after several years of nonattainment status persist after
attainment status has been gained. Gaining attainment status does affect revenues in
contiguous jurisdictions; the surrounding areas no longer have the same regulatory
advantage. This results in small revenue decreases for contiguous cities and temporary
property tax revenue decreases for contiguous counties.
Finally, local governments address the revenue changes resulting from
nonattainment status by altering current public service expenditure levels. Thus, the fiscal
impacts of nonattainment status not only affect bureaucrats, but they also have tangible
impacts on residents via changes in local public service delivery.
Understanding these fiscal impacts could encourage local officials in population
centers to pursue Early Action Compacts, an alternative to nonattainment status offered
by the EPA beginning in 2003. These Early Action Compacts permit localities that will
likely face nonattainment status to implement their own regulations to improve air quality
instead of following the SIP requirements. Under an Early Action Compact, local
officials have greater flexible in designing pollution regulations; this flexibility could be
used to mitigate negative tax revenue impacts in urban centers. Future research could
compare the fiscal effects of Early Action Compacts to the effects of nonattainment status.
This would shed light on whether the fiscal effects of nonattainment status are unique to
the EPA requirements for SIPs.
Because nonattainment regulations are implemented at the state level, public
officials in central cities that are in nonattainment may argue for special grants from the
state government to compensate for revenue losses. Should state governments create
grant programs for central cities in nonattainment areas because revenue reductions result
in reduced spending on public services? Should outlying jurisdictions that surround
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nonattainment areas be required to share a portion of their tax revenues? In light of the
persistence of the fiscal effects of nonattainment status, how long should any revenue
sharing or grant policies last? Or because city tax revenues in nonattainment areas appear
to be the result of unhealthy levels of polluting activity, are such transfers unfounded
because they ignore the health benefits of cleaner air? The results of this analysis provide
an empirical framework for future research into these issues.
If cities in nonattainment areas do not receive additional funds from the state or
from other jurisdictions, they still have other options at their disposal to mitigate the
negative revenue effects of nonattainment status. Cities can use tax incentives aimed at
encouraging industries to invest in pollution abatement technology instead of relocating.
Tax incentives would be effective for mitigating local tax revenue losses if a relatively
small incentive would prevent a firm from relocating. Also, while cities in nonattainment
areas are at a regulatory disadvantage compared with outlying areas, they have the
potential of other advantages, such as infrastructure. Similar to tax incentives, local
investments in public infrastructure could encourage firms to invest in pollution
abatement instead of relocating production activities. Finally, instead of seeking direct
intergovernmental transfers from the state, cities in nonattainment areas could attempt to
persuade the state to offer tax incentives or to fund infrastructure investments aimed at
mitigating local tax revenue losses.

Copyright © Douglas A. Carr 2007
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

Dissertation Summary

The analysis in this dissertation tells a story of inter-jurisdictional environmental
policy impacts. National environmental policy that causes capital migration is a tool for
inter-jurisdictional competition, providing a political motivation for a national
environmental policy. Also, the Clean Air Act is empirically shown to alter regional
industrial geographies and the fiscal situations of local governments.
Some environmental policies, such as ground-level ozone regulations under the
Clean Air Act, are centralized regulations addressing primarily local issues. Interjurisdictional competition offers one explanation for why national policies regulating
local issues exist. A national environmental policy will affect national returns to capital,
causing capital migration and altering local wage rates throughout the economy. These
changes may benefit capital importing jurisdictions while harming capital exporting
jurisdictions. These effects provide a motivation to influence national environmental
policy. Thus, a national environmental policy may be used as a tool for interjurisdictional competition. This model extends the current literature by providing a
political motivation for supporting a national environmental policy that appears to have
strictly local policy targets.
The outcomes of national environmental policy are empirically examined via the
Clean Air Act. The net local economic impacts of ozone nonattainment status are best
understood using aggregate economic indicators. Nonattainment status is seen to reduce
net economic activity both in nonattainment counties and in the surrounding counties.
Furthermore, the reductions in surrounding counties are similar in magnitude to those in
nonattainment counties. The net economic impacts of the Clean Air Act extend beyond
nonattainment area boundaries, indicating the significance of regional economic linkages.
Manufacturing sector activity declines in nonattainment counties and increases in cities
contiguous to nonattainment areas. This suggests that manufacturing activity does
migrate from nonattainment counties into surrounding population centers.
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Ozone nonattainment status also impacts the fiscal realities of local governments.
Revenues are initially reduced in nonattainment counties, and nonattainment cities
experience sustained revenue reductions. Greater sustained revenue declines in cities than
counties indicate that revenue collection increases in unincorporated nonattainment areas.
Also, revenues show a small increase over time in surrounding counties. Thus, while
nonattainment status reduces revenues collected in regulated population centers,
surrounding areas experience fiscal benefits over time. These benefits appear to reduce
with distance from regulated population centers.
These findings extend the existing empirical literature by analyzing the regional
impacts of ozone regulations under the Clean Air Act. By focusing on both nonattainment
areas and contiguous counties, the inter-jurisdictional regulatory impacts can be
understood. The existence of significant findings in jurisdictions surrounding
nonattainment areas indicates the importance of not excluding such areas from
environmental regulatory impact studies even when the environmental regulation appears
to be strictly local in its implementation.
Analysis of the aggregate economic effects is a departure from the existing
literature, which primarily focuses on polluting industries. By analyzing regulatory
impacts on aggregate economic indicators, I am able to assess the overall local and
regional economic impacts of nonattainment regulations. This analysis captures
production changes as firms may shift operations toward production in nonpolluting
industries, as well as capturing reductions in nonpolluting industries that have significant
ties to regulated polluting industries. While analysis of polluting industries highlights the
direct regulatory impacts on targeted industries, this analysis of aggregate economic
indicators reveals the overall regulatory impacts on local economies.
This dissertation reveals inter-jurisdictional impacts not only through its regional
approach, but also by analyzing the intergovernmental fiscal effects of ozone attainment
status. Federal air quality regulations are found to indirectly impact the revenues and
expenditures of local governments as local tax bases are altered. Also, these effects are
not only observed in nonattainment areas. Federal ozone regulations applied to individual
jurisdictions appear to have positive fiscal impacts in surrounding jurisdictions.
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This research also extends the current literature by taking a more dynamic
approach to analyzing policy impacts. Policy impacts change as firm investment and
relocation decisions are affected over time in nonattainment areas. Furthermore, the
removal of nonattainment regulations should not be expected to immediately and
completely reverse nonattainment policy impacts. Understanding the ways in which
impacts persist after attainment status has been gained paints a more complete picture of
ozone regulatory effects.
The empirical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 shows that economic and fiscal
impacts experienced during nonattainment largely persist after attainment status has been
gained. Specifically, the overall economic declines experienced during nonattainment
partially persist after attainment status has been gained. Also, compared with the
expected total revenues after a decade of nonattainment, revenues are relatively
unchanged when cities and counties gain attainment.
In summary, this research extends the existing literature in several directions. The
regional approach, dynamic emphasis, and inter-jurisdictional focus provide a broader
understanding of ozone nonattainment regulatory impacts. This research also provides a
political motivation for the formation of national environmental regulations. The
remainder of this discussion focuses on the implications of these findings.

Reflecting on Regional Impacts

Ozone nonattainment regulations are seen to have economic impacts not only in
nonattainment areas but also in surrounding areas. Both manufacturing sector and total
economic activity is reduced in nonattainment areas. Total economic activity is also
reduced in counties contiguous to nonattainment areas, although the reductions are
smaller than they are in nonattainment areas. This suggests that regional economic
linkages cause nonattainment regulations to have regional impacts that extend beyond the
borders of nonattainment areas. The current literature focuses on nonattainment counties
when assessing the impacts of nonattainment regulations. The exclusion of surrounding
areas results in underestimates of regional and national impacts.
Nonattainment regulations impact both the regional economy and the fiscal
realities of local governments. Much can be learned by comparing these regulatory
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effects. Cities and counties in nonattainment areas experience initial declines in total
revenue. These initial reductions are likely the result of reduced economic activity in
nonattainment areas. Total revenues for nonattainment cities remain depressed as the city
continues in nonattainment status, while revenues recover in nonattainment counties. This
could be explained by differing industrial impacts in cities and unincorporated areas.
While net county economic activity decreases in nonattainment areas, this could be
driven by decreases in cities. Economic activity migrating into the surrounding
unincorporated areas would explain why city revenues remain depressed while county
revenues recover. Economic recovery may be more difficult in cities where regulatory
costs are likely concentrated.
Manufacturing activity increases in cities that are contiguous to nonattainment
areas. This observation supports the hypothesis that polluting activity relocates to
surrounding areas, driving the positive fiscal impacts in the region surrounding regulated
urban areas. However, declines in total economic activity are seen in counties contiguous
to nonattainment areas. This suggests that manufacturing activity is more closely tied to
local revenues than is other economic activity. Thus, while total economic activity
declines in regions containing nonattainment areas, the fiscal effects of nonattainment
regulations diminish with distance from the regulated population centers.

Policy Implications and Future Research

This analysis has several implications for public policy. First, national
environmental regulatory outcomes would likely be more efficient if horizontal
competition did not occur. If policy impacts were limited to regulated jurisdictions, interjurisdictional competition would not be a factor in the formation of national air quality
regulations. Because regional economic linkages cause Clean Air Act regulatory impacts
to spill over into neighboring jurisdictions, perhaps the best way to limit regulatory
impacts outside nonattainment boundaries is to limit the economic impacts within
nonattainment areas. Regulations governing state implementation plan, or SIP, approval
require technology-based approaches to mitigating local pollution. Replacing these
requirements with market-based approaches is expected to reduce the industrial impacts
of nonattainment regulations (Krupnick and McConnell, 2000).
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A policy experiment currently exists that could be used to empirically test the
impacts of different ozone regulations. In 2003 the EPA offered localities that would
likely face nonattainment for the new 8-hour ozone standard the opportunity to form an
Early Action Compact, or EAC. Each EAC is charged with complying with the new 8hour air quality standard sooner than would be required by nonattainment regulations; as
long as the EAC meets intermediate air quality goals, nonattainment status is deferred.
An EAC is not subject to the same regulatory requirements that govern a SIP. As data
become available in the coming years, it would be enlightening to analyze how replacing
SIP regulations has altered the regional regulatory impacts.
To the extent that horizontal competition is not removed from air quality
regulations, jurisdictions could use focused local economic development efforts to
improve their ability to compete. Given that aggregate economic activity declines in and
around nonattainment areas, local economic development efforts could focus on
replacing the locally declining polluting industries with other industries that are less
affected by nonattainment regulations. Such economic development would be helpful not
only in nonattainment areas, but also in the surrounding jurisdictions. Furthermore,
because economic impacts partially persist after attainment status has been gained, local
commitment to this type of economic development would be beneficial even after the
gaining of attainment status.
Finally, because federal regulations governing the implementation of state
policies result in local revenue decreases for nonattainment cities, these cities may argue
for intergovernmental grants to offset declining revenues. Even though revenue declines
in these cities are permanent, persisting after attainment status has been gained,
permanent annual grants from the state or federal government would likely be difficult to
secure. Instead of compensating for reduced revenue, temporary intergovernmental grants
could be used to spur local economic development. Improvements to local infrastructure
or some public services could make a locality more attractive to business, helping
mitigate nonattainment regulatory impacts.
Future research should focus on reducing the horizontal competition related to
environmental policies. Theoretical research could compare national policy outcomes
resulting from the horizontal competition described in Chapter 2 with the outcomes of
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different policy instruments. Also, the empirical impacts of altering air quality policy
tools can be assessed by studying EAC impacts as data becomes available.
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